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HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER KIOBEL: CHOICE OF LAW AND 
THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL TORT LITIGATION 
Roger P. Alford∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. held that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the Alien Tort Statute. As 
such, international human rights litigation as currently practiced in the United 
States is dead. The demise of the ATS will signal the rise of transnational tort 
litigation. Virtually every complaint pleading a human rights violation could 
allege a traditional domestic or foreign tort violation. With transnational tort 
claims, there is no presumption against extraterritoriality. Instead, courts 
apply state or foreign tort laws based on traditional choice-of-law principles. 
The purpose of this Article is to outline the future of human rights litigation 
in the United States by reframing human rights as international wrongs 
resolved through transnational tort litigation. This Article analyzes Kiobel’s 
impact on the future of human rights litigation and introduces transnational 
tort litigation as a viable alternative, with particular focus on the competing 
choice-of-law approaches. It then describes how these choice-of-law 
approaches have been applied in the international terrorism context and likely 
would be applied in the human rights context. This Article concludes with a 
detailed analysis of the virtues of transnational tort litigation, with specific 
emphasis on extraterritoriality, universality, liability thresholds, corporate 
liability, damages, notice pleading, forum non conveniens, and preemption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human rights violations are transnational torts. Torture is assault and 
battery. Terrorism is wrongful death. Slavery is false imprisonment. Federal 
law concedes as much, vesting federal courts with jurisdiction over “any civil 
action by an alien for . . . tort[s] only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”1 Until the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,2 foreigners could rely on this 
statute—commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)3—to sue 
individuals or entities for human rights violations that occurred anywhere in 
the world. The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel applied the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to severely limit the territorial reach of the ATS,4 the 
most important human rights statute in the United States. Henceforth, the only 
claims that may go forward under the ATS are those that touch and concern the 
territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.5 The overwhelming majority of ATS claims will not 
satisfy this test. As such, human rights litigation as currently practiced in the 
United States is dead. 
The demise of the ATS will signal the rise of transnational tort litigation. 
When one compares facts and considers remedies, virtually every complaint 
pleading an ATS violation could allege a traditional domestic or foreign tort 
violation. It is perhaps unseemly to treat grave human rights abuses as garden-
variety torts.6 But with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel, 
reframing human rights violations as transnational torts may be the only viable 
alternative for redressing international wrongs through U.S. litigation. In the 
quest to provide relief for victims of grave abuse, international human rights 
violations should be reframed as transnational torts. With common law tort 
claims, there is no presumption against extraterritoriality. Instead, there is a 
decision to apply state or foreign tort law based on choice-of-law principles. 
 
 1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 2 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 3 The ATS is also sometimes referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) or the Alien Tort Act 
(ATA). 
 4 Id. at 1669. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (explaining that municipal tort law is 
an inadequate placeholder for the kinds of wrongs meant to be addressed by the ATS); Paul Hoffman & Beth 
Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 9, 21 
(2013) (citing Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 183). 
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Reframing human rights as transnational torts is not novel in practice, but it 
has been ignored by the legal academy. In the terrorism context, plaintiffs have 
used this tactic to secure billions of dollars in judgments against state sponsors 
of terrorism.7 They typically have done so by invoking choice-of-law 
principles to apply domestic tort laws to redress foreign terrorist attacks.8 The 
United States’ interest in combatting international terrorism has been the 
decisive factor leading to the application of domestic law, which typically 
results in the application of state tort law of the plaintiffs’ domicile.9 
A similar approach could be undertaken with respect to other human rights 
violations. Rather than pursuing claims for wrongful conduct under the ATS, 
those same victims could plead violations of domestic or foreign tort laws. 
Courts seized with such claims would apply choice-of-law principles to assess 
the appropriate tort law to resolve the dispute. If the United States has a 
paramount interest in addressing the human rights violation, then that likely 
will result in the application of domestic tort law. Otherwise, traditional 
choice-of-law analysis applied in the international human rights context will 
often result in the application of foreign tort law. 
As a practical matter, transnational tort litigation allows state and federal 
courts to continue to adjudicate international human rights claims. Kiobel’s 
territorial limitations will result in the dismissal of most ATS claims. But 
claims based on the same facts can continue in state and federal courts 
pursuant to either state or foreign tort laws. Accordingly, human rights 
litigation will survive the demise of the ATS by reframing the facts, pleading 
tort violations, and applying either state or foreign tort laws. 
As a normative matter, transnational tort litigation is preferable to human 
rights litigation because it avoids the uncertainties and concerns typically 
raised about ATS litigation.10 With human rights litigation in the United States, 
courts will favor the commonplace over the exotic. Even prior to Kiobel, courts 
were skeptical of ATS litigation,11 but routinely employed choice-of-law rules 
 
 7 See Jeewon Kim, Note, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A Separation of Powers Discourse 
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513, 524 (2004); infra text 
accompanying note 176. 
 8 See infra text accompanying notes 107–75. 
 9 See Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell II), No. Civ.A. 01-2224JDB, 2005 WL 
756090, at *20 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005). 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 19–24. 
 11 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 770 (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), 
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 71–73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part), 
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to resolve cross-border tort claims.12 Courts’ familiarity with choice-of-law 
analysis is one of its greatest virtues. It is also familiar to the relevant 
stakeholders in transnational tort litigation. Choice-of-law analysis 
accommodates the interests of other nations, the expectations of the parties, 
and the needs of the interstate system. It applies the law one would expect: the 
law that advances legitimate governmental interests and that has the closest 
connection to the dispute and the parties. As such, the routine application of 
choice of law in the transnational torts context avoids many of the 
controversial questions raised by ATS litigation. For plaintiffs, transnational 
tort litigation in state courts has many virtues when compared to ATS litigation 
in federal courts, including the extraterritorial application of common law tort 
claims, lower pleading standards and liability thresholds, corporate 
responsibility for tortious conduct, fewer dismissals on the basis of preemption 
or forum non conveniens, and universal acceptance of a private right of action 
for intentional torts. 
The purpose of this Article is to outline the future of human rights litigation 
in the United States by reframing human rights as international wrongs 
resolved through transnational tort litigation. Choice of law will feature as the 
key question for the future of transnational tort litigation. Although there are 
other relevant issues that arise when human rights litigation is reframed as 
transnational tort litigation, choice of law is the most salient, unsettled, and 
underappreciated. There is neither scholarly literature that attempts to reframe 
human rights violations as transnational torts nor any scholarship that 
systematically analyzes international terrorism and human rights violations 
through a choice-of-law lens. 
Part I of this Article summarizes the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel 
with particular attention to the consequences that decision has for the demise 
of ATS litigation and the rise of transnational tort litigation. Because the 
presumption against extraterritoriality severely limits the reach of the ATS, 
plaintiffs have few alternatives other than alleging violations of domestic or 
foreign tort laws. 
 
vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 
244, 255 (2d Cir. 2009); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2009) (Wesley, J., 
dissenting); Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 384 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 560 U.S. 305 (2010); Viet. Ass’n for 
Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay 
Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 296 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 
U.S. 1028 (2008). 
 12 See infra note 41. 
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Part II of this Article briefly introduces the choice-of-law approaches 
applied in the United States, particularly as applied to the transnational context. 
After Kiobel, the choice of the appropriate tort law will be critical for resolving 
claims alleging international wrongful conduct. Unfortunately, choice of law in 
the United States is confusing, with fifty-two jurisdictions adopting several 
different choice-of-law approaches. Understanding transnational tort litigation 
requires an appreciation of these different approaches. 
This Article then outlines the past and future of human rights litigation 
reframed as transnational tort litigation. Part III provides a detailed analysis of 
how choice-of-law principles have been successfully applied to redress 
international terrorism. Because terrorism triggers paramount governmental 
interests, more often than not courts have applied domestic tort laws to resolve 
international terrorism disputes. 
Part IV addresses how the divergent choice-of-law approaches might be 
applied in the human rights context, with specific reference to how courts 
might determine the appropriate law when faced with the facts of well-known 
human rights cases. Unlike in terrorism cases, a choice-of-law analysis of 
human rights violations committed on foreign soil typically results in the 
application of foreign law. That is to say, if one analyzes the major choice-of-
law approaches and applies them to the facts of prominent human rights cases, 
courts will typically apply foreign tort laws to resolve claims alleging foreign 
conduct that causes foreign injuries. 
Finally, Part V concludes with a discussion of the virtues of transnational 
tort litigation. Lest one assume that transnational tort litigation is a poor 
alternative to human rights litigation, this Article outlines the numerous 
advantages of this approach over traditional human rights litigation. First, state 
tort laws have no presumption against extraterritoriality. Second, tort laws are 
universal, with almost every jurisdiction providing civil remedies for negligent 
or intentional conduct that harms others. Third, tort laws have much lower 
liability thresholds than the standards applied under international law, allowing 
claims to be brought for intentional torts, simple negligence, and strict products 
liability. Fourth, tort laws recognize corporate liability without the need to 
show that the entity aided and abetted government abuse with the requisite 
intent. Fifth, choice-of-law rules are sufficiently nuanced to apply one law to 
determine liability and another law to determine damages. Sixth, tort claims 
pursued under state law in state court permit notice pleading, obviating the 
need to satisfy the heightened pleading standard applicable in federal court. 
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Seventh, forum non conveniens does not have the same force or favor in state 
courts as in federal courts. Eighth, preemption will rarely be an issue where a 
court applies state or foreign tort laws to resolve the dispute. 
I. KIOBEL AND THE DEMISE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
The history of international human rights litigation under the ATS is well-
known.13 Since Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,14 such litigation has become something 
of a cottage industry, with over 150 cases filed alleging the commission of a 
tort in violation of the law of nations.15 The ATS became one of the most 
important litigation vehicles for victims of human rights abuses. Contingency 
and pro bono lawyers well-versed in international law could sue deep-pocket 
corporations for aiding and abetting grave foreign governmental misconduct. 
For over two decades, interpretation of the ATS developed without the benefit 
 
 13 There is extensive commentary on both the history of the ATS and the litigation that it has spawned. 
See generally, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011) (discussing the history and meaning of the ATS); Curtis A. Bradley, Attorney 
General Bradford’s Opinion and the Alien Tort Statute, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 509 (2012) (explaining debates 
over the ATS and the reliance by participants in those debates on a 1795 opinion by U.S. Attorney General 
William Bradford); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002) 
(detailing the history of the ATS); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary 
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007) (analyzing the 
Court’s Sosa decision within the context of its Erie decision and considering several areas of likely debate 
concerning the ATS); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations 
on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 689 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that “the Framers 
wanted to give the federal courts jurisdiction over suits involving the law of nations”); Ryan Goodman & 
Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 466 (1997) (discussing Filartiga, “[t]he break-through ATCA case”); Eugene 
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort 
Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 112 (2004) (noting a debate concerning the ATS: whether it merely 
grants jurisdiction or allows suits to be brought on the basis of “customary international law”); Julian G. Ku, 
The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial 
Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 353 (2011) (challenging the common perception that the ATS “imposes 
liability on private corporations for violations of customary international law”); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-
Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006) (advancing the “safe-conduct 
theory,” which posits a new role for the ATS—it would permit redress of common law torts that private actors 
commit so long as there is a U.S. nexus); Carlos M. Vázquez, Alien Tort Claims and the Status of Customary 
International Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 531 (2012) (observing that most scholarly debate on customary 
international law has focused on litigation over the ATS). 
 14 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 15 See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court 
Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 460 (2011); Michael Goldhaber, The Life 
and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/ 
LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202473215797 (citing Jonathan C. Drimmer, Corporate ATCA Cases, AM. LAW. 
DAILY, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/ATS%20Cases.pdf (last visited May 4, 2014). 
ALFORD GALLEYSPROOFS2 6/9/2014 9:06 AM 
1096 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1089 
of U.S. Supreme Court review.16 Finally in 2004, the Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain limited the scope of the ATS, but left the door ajar to further 
litigation, “subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”17 The central holding of Sosa was 
that the ATS was a jurisdictional statute that nonetheless permitted common 
law causes of action for torts committed in violation of “the present-day law of 
nations,” provided those claims rested on accepted international norms and 
were defined with sufficient specificity.18 
Since that time, lower courts struggled to answer the many questions Sosa 
left unresolved.19 Among the open questions were whether claimants were 
required to exhaust local remedies,20 alien claims against aliens were 
cognizable federal questions,21 corporations were amenable to suit under 
 
 16 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 242 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 
F.3d 932, 944–56 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103–06 (2d Cir. 2000); Beanal v. 
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1999); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771–73 
(9th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadz̆ić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 
965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam).  
 17 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). 
 18 Id. at 725. The Court stated that the modern-day international norms must be “accepted by the civilized 
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,” namely 
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 715, 724–25. 
 19 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 743–44 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(2013); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe VIII v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Presbyterian Church 
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 
174 (2d Cir. 2009); Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 374–75 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 560 U.S. 305 (2010); 
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 
262 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008). 
 20 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 743; Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1024–25; Exxon, 654 F.3d at 27; Bowoto v. Chevron 
Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1096–97, (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010); Rosica (Rose) 
Popova, Sarei v. Rio Tinto and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims 
Act: Short-Term Justice, but at What Cost?, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 517, 518 (2007). 
 21 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 752–54; Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 309–10; Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 
782–83 (6th Cir. 2007); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Response, Sosa, Federal Question Jurisdiction, and Historical 
Fidelity, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 15, 16 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview. 
org/files/bellia.pdf.  
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international law,22 corporations were liable for aiding and abetting 
governmental misconduct,23 and the ATS applied extraterritorially.24 
On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court in Kiobel issued a landmark 
decision that signals the end of this Filartiga human rights revolution. It did so 
by embracing the presumption against extraterritoriality, a presumption 
designed to avoid “unintended clashes between our laws and those of other 
nations which could result in international discord.”25 The Court concluded 
that nothing in the text, history, or purpose of the statute negated a presumption 
against extraterritoriality.26 The text provides no evidence that Congress 
intended causes of action to have extraterritorial reach.27 The history of the 
statute offers instances in which the statute was applied within the United 
States and on the high seas, but little to no support for its application on the 
territory of another sovereign.28 The purpose of the statute was not to transform 
the fledgling country into “the custos morum of the whole world,”29 but rather 
to provide a means for “judicial relief to foreign officials injured in the United 
States.”30 Therefore, the Court held the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applied to limit the reach of the ATS.31 
 
 22 See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1015; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116–17 (2d Cir. 
2010), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Viet. Ass’n, 517 F.3d at 108; Ku, supra note 13, at 354–
55; Julian Ku, Response: Rethinking the Direction of the Alien Tort Statute, 100 GEO. L.J. 2217, 2219–21 
(2012). 
 23 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 748–49; Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 188; Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315; Khulumani, 504 
F.3d at 260; Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2007); Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and 
Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 306 (2008). 
 24 See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 318 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012); Exxon, 654 F.3d at 18–20; Sikhs for 
Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. 
 25 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 26 Id. at 1661.  
 27 Id. at 1666 (“The reference to ‘tort’ does not demonstrate that the First Congress ‘necessarily meant’ 
for those causes of action to reach conduct in the territory of a foreign sovereign. In the end, nothing in the text 
of the ATS evinces the requisite clear indication of extraterritoriality.”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
 28 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666–67 (“Nor does the historical background against which the ATS was 
enacted overcome the presumption against application to conduct in the territory of another sovereign.”). 
 29 Id. at 1668 (quoting United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) 
(No. 15,551)) (“[T]here is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely 
hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms. . . . The ATS ensured that the United States could 
provide a forum for adjudicating such incidents.”). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 1669. 
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As applied to the facts in Kiobel, the case had almost no connection to the 
United States: Nigerian plaintiffs were suing Dutch, British, and Nigerian 
corporations for alleged human rights violations that occurred in Nigeria.32 
Given that all the relevant conduct occurred outside the United States, the 
Court concluded that the statute did not reach the plaintiffs’ claims.33 As for 
other claims that “touch and concern the territory of the United States,” the 
Court concluded that “they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.”34 
The Kiobel decision is complex and confusing, offering scant guidance as 
to how lower courts should proceed when claims touch and concern U.S. 
territory. However, the purpose of this Article is not to analyze Kiobel, but 
rather to consider the future of human rights litigation in the United States in 
light of Kiobel.35 The effective result of Kiobel is to severely limit ATS 
litigation in the United States. The old Filartiga paradigm of using the statute 
to redress human rights violations of foreign defendants committed against 
foreign plaintiffs on foreign soil36 is dead. Because “[m]odern ATS litigation 
almost always involves conduct that took place outside the United States,”37 
the presumption against extraterritoriality will foreclose the vast majority of 
ATS cases. To be sure, future litigation will clarify how sufficient the 
territorial nexus to the United States must be to rebut the presumption. Thus 
 
 32 Id. at 1662, 1669. 
 33 Id. at 1669. 
 34 Id. 
 35 For detailed analysis of the Court’s decision in Kiobel, see generally, for example, Roger P. Alford, 
The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Anthony J. 
Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014); Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves the Door 
Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); William R. Casto, The ATS Cause of Action Is Sui 
Generis, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363695; 
William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); 
Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent with International Trends, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The 
Evolving Role of the Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Ralph 
G. Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch and Concern” the United States: Justice 
Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the 
Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Carlos M. Vazquez, Things We Do with 
Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); 
Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 601 (2013).  
 36 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 37 Bradley, supra note 13, at 512. 
ALFORD GALLEYSPROOFS2 6/9/2014 9:06 AM 
2014] HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER KIOBEL 1099 
far, lower courts have required substantial contact with the territory of the 
United States to rebut the presumption.38 
If the ATS as we know it is dead, what avenues will human rights victims 
pursue going forward? At least for claims filed in the United States, the answer 
is transnational tort litigation.39 In virtually every instance, conduct that 
constitutes an international human rights violation is also cognizable as 
wrongful conduct under domestic or foreign tort laws. Invoking state law in 
pursuit of human rights is not novel.40 As discussed below, there are dozens of 
 
 38 See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189–93 (2d Cir. 2013); Adhikari v. Daoud & 
Partners, No. 4:09-CV-1237, 2014 WL 198305, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2014); In re S. African Apartheid 
Litig., No. 02 MDL 1499(SAS), 2013 WL 6813877, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013); Tymoshenko v. 
Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *3–4 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013); Adhikari v. 
Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013); Kaplan v. Cent. 
Bank, No. 10-483(RCL), 2013 WL 4427943, at *16 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. 
Lively, No. 12-cv-30051-MAP, 2013 WL 4130756, at *13–15 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013); Giraldo v. 
Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at *5–6 & n.4, *8–9 & n.6 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 
2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858, 865–67 (E.D. Va. 2013); see also Roger 
Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Interpreting “Touch and Concern,” OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 19, 2013, 9:59 AM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/19/kiobel–insta–symposium–interpreting–touch–and–concern/ (discussing 
Kiobel’s reliance on Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), in interpreting when 
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption). 
But see Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (holding 
the presumption against extraterritoriality was overcome by the defendant’s status as a permanent resident of 
the United States), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 5493032 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013). 
 39 Another possibility is the Torture Victim Protection Act, but that statute is of limited use because it 
applies only to torture and extrajudicial killings and because it precludes claims against governments, 
corporations, and nongovernmental entities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012) (Torture Victim Protection); 
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710–11 (2012) (holding that claims against an “individual” 
within the meaning of the statute are limited to natural persons). For a discussion of the limits of pursuing 
human rights under other federal or state statutes, see Alford, supra note 35; Christopher A. Whytock, Donald 
Earl Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword: After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in 
State Courts and Under State Law, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2013). For a discussion about pursuing human 
rights claims as either federal or state common law causes of action, see Colangelo, supra note 35; Roger 
Alford, Does the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Apply to the ATS or the Underlying Federal Common 
Law Claims?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:11 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/24/presumption-
extraterritoriality-apply-ats-federal-common-law-claims/; Anthony Colangelo, Kiobel and Conflicts of Law, 
OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 28, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-colangelo-kiobel-
conflicts-law/; and William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to 
Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-
dodge-presumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-statutes/.  
 40 Even at the time the ATS was enacted, Congress recognized that redress in state courts was available 
for intentional torts, including claims by aliens against aliens. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 13, at 450–51, 
520; see also Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights Cases, 3 
UC IRVINE L. REV. 81, 84–86 (2013) (discussing transitory tort claims filed in state courts in the late 
eighteenth century). 
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human rights cases that have alleged common law tort violations.41 Indeed, the 
facts of Kiobel represent an example of plaintiffs alleging state and foreign tort 
law violations in addition to ATS claims.42 This practice of relying on state tort 
laws to press human rights claims has been almost completely ignored by the 
legal academy,43 and no scholarship has analyzed the choice-of-law questions 
presented by such human rights litigation. The predicate question for the 
application of tort laws is which law should be applied? That question depends 
on the forum’s application of choice-of-law principles. 
II. THE CHOICE-OF-LAW MAZE 
The future of human rights litigation in the United States requires the 
reframing of human rights violations as common law torts. Plaintiffs are 
already signaling their embrace of state tort laws in lieu of the ATS,44 and 
corporate defendants are anxiously wondering, “If the ATS cannot rule the 
world, how can state law rule the world?”45 The answer is that state law will 
not “rule the world,” assuming courts undertake a proper choice-of-law 
analysis. After Kiobel, whether to apply state or foreign tort law will be a 
central question, perhaps the central question, in future human rights litigation 
in the United States. With the demise of the ATS, the choice of the appropriate 
 
 41 In addition to the terrorism cases alleging common law tort violations discussed in Part III, there are 
dozens of ATS cases that have alleged common law tort claims. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 
F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2012); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 
F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh 
Produce N.A., 578 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009); Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 171, 172 
n.5 (3d Cir. 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated by 
Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. 1702; Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2008); Abagninin v. 
Amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 2008); Arias v. DynCorp, 928 F. Supp. 2d. 10, 14 (D.D.C. 
2013); Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle 
USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (2013); In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 
2010); Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 6, at 10. See generally Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 15 
(discussing the ATS and the increasing number of transnational tort cases). 
 42 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2000) (arising from the same set 
of facts as Kiobel and alleging both state and foreign tort law violations). 
 43 For a recent symposium (in which the author presented a draft of this Article) on human rights in state 
courts and under state law, see Symposium, Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 
UC IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 44 See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858 (E.D. Va. 2013); Class Action 
Complaint at 55–64, Georges v. United Nations, No. 1:13-cv-07146-JPO (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013); cf. Hoffman 
& Stephens, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that “state tort claims may . . . be significantly broader than ATS 
claims”). 
 45 DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SHOULD STATE LAW RULE 
THE WORLD? A CALL FOR CAUTION IN APPLYING STATE LAW TO TRANSNATIONAL TORT CASES 15 (2013), 
available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/StateLawRuletheWorld.pdf. 
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tort law will be the fulcrum for resolving claims alleging transnational 
wrongful conduct. 
Unfortunately, choice of law is one of the more complex subjects of 
transnational law, presenting a maze of confusing passages, wrong turns, and 
intersecting paths.46 In the torts context, it is one of the few areas of law that 
requires an annual spreadsheet to simply comprehend the subject.47 Rigid rules 
create harsh results, so in their place courts have adopted a labyrinth of 
confusing choice-of-law principles for the exercise of sound judgment. 
The principal reason for this complexity is that the different approaches 
reflect different priorities.48 Most jurisdictions focus on relationships, such that 
the law governing a dispute will be that of the jurisdiction that has the most 
significant relationship to the events or the parties.49 Other jurisdictions focus 
on territory, so that the substantive law governing the dispute will be the law 
of the place of the wrong: lex loci delicti.50 A few jurisdictions focus on 
governmental interests, with one version balancing competing interests51 and 
the other focusing on the forum’s interests.52 Still fewer jurisdictions focus on 
outcomes, so that the law governing the dispute will be that which produces the 
best result.53 Finally, a handful of jurisdictions do not focus on any one theme, 
but adopt an eclectic approach that combines elements of the other 
approaches.54 
It should come as no surprise that choice of law is in such a state of 
confusion. Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., federal 
courts defer to state choice-of-law rules, and state courts are free to balance 
 
 46 Writing over a half century ago, one scholar described the discipline as “a dismal swamp . . . inhabited 
by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible 
jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.” William L. Prosser, 
Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953). 
 47 See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011: Twenty-Fifth 
Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 309 tbl.1 (2012). 
 48 For a detailed discussion of the various approaches, see PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON 
C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.1–.27 (5th ed. 2010). 
 49 See infra text accompanying notes 57–68. 
 50 See infra text accompanying notes 69–75. 
 51 See infra text accompanying notes 82–85. 
 52 See infra text accompanying notes 86–89. 
 53 See infra text accompanying notes 92–100. 
 54 See infra text accompanying notes 101–06. 
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competing concerns as they see fit.55 If state courts in fifty-two jurisdictions 
are free to pick and choose among various priorities, the possible solutions to 
the choice-of-law conundrum are almost immeasurable. With so many inputs, 
probability analysis would reveal literally hundreds of available outcomes. It is 
little wonder that even the most sophisticated jurists find it difficult to untie the 
Gordian knot. 
Despite this invitation to Bedlam, courts have settled on a smaller menu of 
choices, such that today one can discern a distinct majority approach and a 
handful of minority positions. The remainder of this section briefly outlines the 
five choice-of-law approaches, an appreciation of which is essential before one 
can invoke choice of law to resolve transnational tort disputes.56 Each 
approach has its own unique emphasis that determines whether foreign or 
domestic tort law should apply to resolve transnational human rights 
violations. 
A. Majority Approach: Most Significant Relationship 
A majority of states have adopted some version of the Restatement 
(Second) approach, applying the law of the jurisdiction that has the most 
significant relationship to the dispute.57 Twenty-four jurisdictions have adopted 
this approach,58 three other states have a truncated version of it,59 and several 
others adopt an eclectic approach that incorporates elements of it.60 As such, 
the majority approach is unmatched in its influence on modern choice-of-law 
jurisprudence. 
 
 55 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938)) (holding that, in a diversity case, the district court must apply the choice-of-law 
rules of the state in which it sits). 
 56 While there are choice-of-law summaries available, see HAY ET AL., supra note 48, §§ 2.01–.27; see 
generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (6th ed. 2010), this Article 
focuses on the international application of these approaches.  
 57 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971). 
 58 These jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, 
Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 309 tbl.1. 
 59 These jurisdictions—Indiana, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico—embrace the general rules of 
section 145 but not the principles of section 6. See Bonn v. P.R. Int’l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 91–92 (1st 
Cir. 1975); Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Ind. 2004); Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 
N.E.2d 1071, 1073–74 (Ind. 1987); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 755 (N.D. 1972); Fernández v. Am. 
Sur. Co. of N.Y., 93 P.R. 28, 46 (1966). See generally HAY ET AL., supra note 48, § 2.22 (discussing how 
Indiana, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico have adopted the so-called significant contacts approach).  
 60 See infra text accompanying notes 101–06. 
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Under this approach courts combine almost a dozen incongruent 
ingredients to achieve a palatable result. Seven disparate factors are considered 
in the analysis: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the 
relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other 
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified 
expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of 
law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease 
in the determination and application of the law to be applied.61 
After mixing these together, courts combine other ingredients, considering a 
nonexhaustive list of contacts: 
(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the 
conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, 
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the 
parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the 
parties is centered.62 
Finally, the Restatement (Second) suggests that courts apply various 
rebuttable presumptions. With torts involving personal injury or wrongful 
death, courts give presumptive weight to the place of injury.63 Thus, if torture 
or extrajudicial killings are reframed as transnational torts, the presumption is 
that the lex loci delicti should control.64 
Many courts emphasize the general sections over the presumptions, with 
the result that factors other than lex loci delicti often control.65 This is 
particularly so when the parties share common domiciles but the injuries occur 
 
 61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6(2). Not all of these factors require equal 
emphasis, particularly in the torts context. Id. § 145 cmt. b (explaining that the four factors of particular 
relevance in the torts context “are the needs of the interstate and international systems, the relevant policies of 
the forum, the relevant policies of other interested states and particularly of the state with the dominant interest 
in the determination of the particular issue, and ease in the determination and application of the law to be 
applied”). 
 62 Id. § 145(2). 
 63 Id. §§ 146, 156, 175. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See, e.g., Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 948 A.2d 955, 973–76 (Conn. 2008); Veasley v. CRST Int’l, Inc., 553 
N.W.2d 896, 897–99 (Iowa 1996); Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d 570, 572–73 (Me. 1995); In re Estate of 
Blanton, 2001-CA-00264-SCT (¶¶ 11–15) (Miss. 2002); Burhenn v. Dennis Supply Co., 2004 SD 91, ¶¶ 24–
28, 685 N.W.2d 778, 784–85; Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318–19 (Tex. 1979); Forsman v. 
Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 219–20 (Utah 1989); Myers v. Langlois, 721 A.2d 129, 132 (Vt. 1998); Miller v. 
White, 702 A.2d 392, 394–97 (Vt. 1997); Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., 875 P.2d 1213, 1217–19 (Wash. 1994). 
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elsewhere.66 Other courts take the presumptions quite seriously, and typically 
apply the lex loci delicti.67 In the international context in particular, courts 
favor the territorial presumption to limit the debilitating legal uncertainties that 
result if individuals carry their domiciliary law wherever they go.68 
B. First Minority Approach: Lex Loci Delicti 
The majority approach is the dominant methodology, but there are notable 
minority positions, and none is more significant than lex loci delicti. The focus 
of this approach is on territory, not relationships. Ten jurisdictions retain this 
traditional approach for torts.69 
Under this traditional approach, adopted by the Restatement (First), “[t]he 
place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor 
liable for an alleged tort takes place.”70 Because injury is necessary for 
liability, the traditional rule “applie[s] the law of the place where the injury 
occurred.”71 In most human rights cases—torture, extrajudicial killings, 
slavery, and terrorism—the place of wrongful conduct and injury will 
coincide.72 Where the tort and injuries occur abroad, jurisdictions adopting the 
territorial test will resolve the dispute by applying the foreign law where the 
injuries occurred.73 
 
 66 See, e.g., Myers, 721 A.2d at 132; Miller, 702 A.2d at 393, 397. 
 67 See, e.g., Clinton v. Enter. Rent-a-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895–96 (Del. 2009); Bishop v. Fla. Specialty 
Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980); Grover v. Isom, 53 P.3d 821, 824 (Idaho 2002); Townsend v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ill. 2007); Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, ¶¶ 31–35, 
298 Mont. 438, 995 P.2d 1002; Malena v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 850, 856–58 (Neb. 2002); P.V. v. 
Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 461, 468 (N.J. 2008); Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286, 289–90 (Ohio 
1984). 
 68 See Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Jack L. Goldsmith & 
Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1137, 1147 (2007) (“Lex loci eliminates . . . distorting economic effect by ensuring that all firms are 
subject to the same standard of liability for torts committed in a particular place.”). 
 69 These jurisdictions are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 309 tbl.1. 
 70 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). 
 71 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 705 (2004) (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11–
12 (1962)). This rule occasionally will have curious results, particularly when the location of injury is 
fortuitous.  
 72 In some cases, the wrongful conduct will be in one jurisdiction whereas the injuries will occur 
elsewhere. In such cases, the law of the place of injury usually will apply. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 377 cmt. a, note 1. 
 73 See, e.g., Baker v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., 358 F. App’x 476, 481 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying Kyrgyz 
law for injuries suffered in Kyrgyzstan); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in 
Dec., 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining that where tort and subsequent injuries 
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To blunt the harsh results of a strict adherence to the lex loci delicti rule, 
jurisdictions apply various “escape devices,” most notably an exception that 
precludes the application of foreign law if doing so offends the public policy of 
the forum.74 When lex loci delicti dictates the application of foreign law, a 
court may refuse “to enforce a right of action which accrued under the law of 
another state” if the court concludes that “it is against good morals or natural 
justice, or that for some other such reason the enforcement of it would be 
prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens.”75 By grafting a public 
policy exception onto the traditional test, courts guarantee that the forum’s 
fundamental interests are protected. 
C. Second Minority Approach: Governmental Interests 
The second minority approach focuses on the governmental interests at 
stake in the dispute. Interests flow out of the intersection of governmental 
policies and governmental relationships with the parties, events, or litigation.76 
As articulated by Brainerd Currie, choice of law is about balancing competing 
interests among jurisdictions that have a legitimate basis to effectuate their 
policies.77 Under this approach, courts determine whether the forum has a 
 
occurred in India, jurisdictions adopting the traditional lex loci delicti test would apply Indian law), aff’d as 
modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764, 780 (D. Kan. 
1981) (“Under lex loci delicti the law of the place of accident (France) would govern.”); Raskin v. Allison, 57 
P.3d 30, 32 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (“We have no hesitation in finding that the lex loci delicti rule would apply 
in tort cases notwithstanding the injuries were incurred in a foreign country.”). 
 74 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2001: Fifteenth Annual Survey, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (2002) (“[T]he remaining traditional states . . . continue to live with the traditional rules—
by disingenuously evading them through trite and transparent escape devices.”); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of 
Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975, 1001–02 
(1994) (explaining that, because the traditional approach did not produce predictability and ease of 
administration, courts developed escape devices, including the public policy exception).  
 75 Rauton v. Pullman Co., 191 S.E. 416, 422 (S.C. 1937) (internal quotation mark omitted). For the most 
celebrated expression of the public policy exception, see Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02 
(N.Y. 1918) (“We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal 
with it otherwise at home. . . . The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the 
judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would 
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted 
tradition of the common weal.”). 
 76 A state has a governmental interest if it has “(a) a governmental policy and (b) a concurrent 
relationship with the parties, the events, or the litigation such as to provide a reasonable basis for application of 
the policy.” BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 737 (1963). Because interests 
flow out of relationships, this approach overlaps with the majority approach. 
 77 See id. at 177–87; see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. 
PA. L. REV. 949, 952–56 (1994).  
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legitimate policy that would be advanced by application of its law.78 If so, then 
they typically will apply forum law, whether or not another jurisdiction has a 
legitimate interest in the dispute.79 
In practice, the governmental interest approach has at least two major 
variants. The lexi fori version, adopted by Kentucky and Michigan, gives 
presumptive weight to the forum’s interests.80 The other version, adopted by 
California and the District of Columbia, espouses an interest-balancing 
approach without an explicit forum preference.81 
The lex fori version applied in Kentucky and Michigan presumes that 
forum law should apply unless there are valid reasons to do otherwise.82 As 
long as the forum has “significant contacts—not necessarily the most 
significant contacts”—forum law should apply.83 This presumption dictates the 
outcome in most cases, unless the connection is simply too remote to justify 
application of forum law.84 However, where the tort occurs in another country 
and no party has a connection to the forum at the time of the tort, the 
presumption typically is overcome, resulting in the application of foreign 
law.85 
 
 78 See CURRIE, supra note 76, at 183–84.  
 79 See id.  
 80 See infra text accompanying notes 82–85. 
 81 See infra text accompanying notes 86–89. 
 82 See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972) (“When the court has jurisdiction of the parties 
its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law.”); Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 
562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997) (“[W]e will apply Michigan law unless a ‘rational reason’ to do otherwise 
exists.”); see also Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113–14 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 
259, 260 (Ky. 1967).  
 83 Foster, 484 S.W.2d at 829; see also Brewster v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 279 S.W.3d 142, 145 & n.8 
(Ky. 2009) (applying Kentucky law because of significant contacts with Kentucky even though contacts with 
other jurisdictions were more significant); Bonnlander v. Leader Nat’l Ins. Co., 949 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1996) (explaining that courts applying Kentucky’s choice-of-law rule found that “any significant contact 
with Kentucky was sufficient to allow Kentucky law to be applied”), abrogated by State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Marley, 151 S.W.3d 33 (Ky. 2004) and Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 990 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1999). 
Michigan courts are less explicit in their preference for forum law, stating that courts should “apply the law of 
the forum unless important policy considerations dictate otherwise.” Sutherland, 562 N.W.2d at 470–71; see 
Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 304 (Mich. 1987); see also Ammend v. BioPort, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 
2d 848, 874–76 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Marks v. W. Side Unlimited Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 716, 718–21 (E.D. 
Mich. 1999). 
 84 See Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 852, 854 (2d Cir. 1998); Custom Prods., Inc. v. Fluor Daniel 
Can., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 767, 771 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Radeljak v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 719 N.W.2d 40, 46 
(Mich. 2006) (per curiam); Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., 582 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
 85 See McGinnis v. Taitano, 3 F. Supp. 2d 767, 768–69 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (explaining where a tort 
occurred in Germany and the tortfeasor moved to Kentucky after the tort occurred, lex loci delicti, rather than 
lex fori, applied to the dispute); cf. Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 943 F. Supp. 789, 792 (W.D. 
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The other variant engages in explicit interest balancing. Under California’s 
comparative impairment approach, courts consider whether there is a true 
conflict between affected states and apply “the law of the state whose interest 
would be the more impaired if its law were not applied.”86 Courts favor forum 
law when (1) the forum has an interest in the dispute and the laws of other 
affected jurisdictions are not different or (2) when the laws are different and 
the interests of the forum would be more impaired than the interests of the 
other jurisdiction.87 Similarly, the District of Columbia applies forum law 
when the forum has an interest in the dispute and the foreign state does not 
have a greater interest in the controversy.88 The focus of both is not which law 
manifests the “‘better’ or the ‘worthier’ social policy,” but rather “‘which 
state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the 
policy of the other state.’”89 
Under either variant, courts have officially eschewed a strict preference for 
forum law. The lex fori approach requires more than a passing interest, while 
the comparative impairment approach will apply forum law only if the forum’s 
interests are greater than the interests of other relevant jurisdictions. Of course, 
the primacy to be given any particular interest at any particular time is ad hoc 
and idiosyncratic. The forum court is free to subjectively identify and compare 
governmental interests and base those interests on virtually any nexus to the 
forum.90 Moreover, in many cases “false conflicts” will result in the 
 
Ky. 1996) (finding that Kentucky had a minimal interest in the dispute between the non-domiciliary plaintiff 
and defendant arising from an accident that occurred in Indiana), aff’d mem., 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 86 Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006) (quoting Bernhard v. Harrah’s 
Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87 See id. (“[T]he governmental interest approach generally involves three steps. First, the court 
determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions . . . is the same or 
different. Second, if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest . . . to determine 
whether a true conflict exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully evaluates and 
compares the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction . . . and then ultimately applies ‘the law of 
the state whose interest would be the more impaired if its law were not applied.’” (quoting Bernhard, 546 P.2d 
at 723)); see also Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 669–74 (Cal. 1974). Conversely, courts will apply 
the law of the other affected jurisdiction if that law is different from California law and its interest would be 
comparatively more impaired. See Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729–31 (Cal. 1967). 
 88 See Biscoe v. Arlington Cnty., 738 F.2d 1352, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Air Crash Disaster near 
Saigon, S. Viet. on Apr. 4, 1975, 476 F. Supp. 521, 526 (D.D.C. 1979); Kaiser-Georgetown Cmty. Health 
Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 509 (D.C. 1985); Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4, 5–6 (D.C. 1978). 
 89 McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516, 533 (Cal. 2010) (quoting Kearney, 137 P.3d at 922). 
 90 See, e.g., Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 469–70 (Mich. 1997) 
(“[C]ourts may not be doing what they purport to do, that is, employing the modern choice-of-law theories in a 
neutral way to determine what law applies. Rather, . . . courts employing the new theories have a very strong 
preference for forum law that frequently causes them to manipulate the theories so that they end up applying 
forum law.”); Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., 582 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that, in 
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application of forum law.91 The practical result is the frequent application of 
forum law. 
D. Third Minority Approach: The Better Law 
The third minority approach focuses on preferred outcomes, pursuing the 
better law to achieve individual justice in particularized cases.92 This approach 
allows courts in these jurisdictions to avoid archaic and unfair laws by 
choosing the law that “make[s] good socio-economic sense for the time when 
the court speaks.”93 The best way to achieve the right result is to choose the 
right set of rules. As Robert Leflar put it, “[t]he urge to do justice in the 
individual case is amply cared for by a wise choice of the better law to govern 
the parties’ claims.”94 
Courts occasionally downplay the search for the better law, concluding that 
“[s]ometimes different laws are neither better nor worse in an objective way, 
just different.”95 Moreover, courts routinely apply laws that do not achieve 
 
cases involving foreign torts and forum domiciliary defendants, Michigan had no interest in affording greater 
recoveries to the North Carolina residents than those afforded under the other jurisdiction’s law). 
 91 For a discussion of false conflicts, see DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 64 (1965); 
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 21 
(2006); Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 881, 892–94 (2009); Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen 
Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1177, 1188–89 (2005); and Peter Kay Westen, False Conflicts, 
55 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 76–78 (1967). 
 92 This approach has been adopted in five jurisdictions: Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Wisconsin. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 309 tbl.1. 
 93 Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 
1588 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations]; see also Hughes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 618, 621 (8th Cir. 2001); Klimstra v. Granstrom, 95 F.3d 686, 690–91 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 1995); Bourgeois v. Vanderbilt, 639 F. Supp. 2d 958, 
964 (W.D. Ark. 2009), aff’d, 417 F. App’x 605 (8th Cir. 2011); Med. Graphics Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
171 F.R.D. 254, 263 (D. Minn. 1997); Schubert v. Target Stores, Inc., 201 S.W.3d 917, 923 (Ark. 2005); 
Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 71 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Ark. 2002); Schlemmer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 
730 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Ark. 1987); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith’s Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 457–58 (Ark. 1977); 
Jepson v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 513 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Minn. 1994); Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 13 
(Minn. 1981); Ferren v. Gen. Motors Corp. Delco Battery Div., 628 A.2d 265, 269 (N.H. 1993); Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1195–97 (N.H. 1988); Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing 
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 302 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, Choice-Influencing 
Considerations]. See generally Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas—The Choice-Influencing 
Considerations, 28 ARK. L. REV. 199 (1974) (discussing “choice-influencing considerations,” including the 
consideration of the “better law”). 
 94 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 302. 
 95 Jepson, 513 N.W.2d at 473; see also Nesladek, 46 F.3d at 741; Kenna v. So-Fro Fabrics, Inc., 18 F.3d 
623, 627 (8th Cir. 1994); Schiele v. Charles Vogel Mfg. Co., 787 F. Supp. 1541, 1554 n.13 (D. Minn. 1992). 
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individualized justice when other considerations are weighed in the balance.96 
Thus, where an American citizen domiciled in the United States is injured by a 
Brazilian airline on a flight in Brazil, concerns for the maintenance of 
international order ordinarily will trump a state court’s conclusion that forum 
law is superior.97 As such, “better law” approaches incorporate themes present 
in other approaches, often resembling the majority or eclectic approaches. 
The “better law” approach allows courts to identify and apply emerging 
trends and forgo the application of laws that are in decline.98 Courts—
particularly lower state courts or federal courts applying state law—can do 
justice in the individual case and nod in the direction of change without 
actually changing the common law.99 This approach strikes a middle path 
between ossified rules and boundless principles, giving courts a narrow 
window to pursue justice within the confines of the best available laws.100 
E. Fourth Minority Approach: Eclecticism 
The final minority approach is an eclectic one that combines previous 
approaches in various permutations.101 The most notable example of this 
eclectic approach is New York’s choice-of-law analysis, which is a fact-
intensive examination of governmental interests and significant contacts. As 
articulated in Neumeier v. Kuehner, New York courts divide torts into cases of 
 
 96 Other “choice-influencing” factors include “A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate 
and international order; C. Simplification of the judicial task; [and] D. Advancement of the forum’s 
governmental interests.” Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 282; see also, e.g., 
Klimstra, 95 F.3d at 690–91; Gomez, 71 S.W.3d at 548; Ferren, 628 A.2d at 269.  
 97 See Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 1596–98 (“The forum court 
probably will not really prefer Brazil’s law, but the balance of considerations will nevertheless impel it to 
apply the disliked law.”). 
 98 See Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 204 N.W.2d 897, 906 (Wis. 1973). 
 99 See Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.R.I. 1972) (deciding, under Rhode Island’s 
“better law” approach, to apply Illinois law to recognize the emerging tort of invasion of privacy because such 
a tort “[was] destined for universal recognition” because it was “founded in the most basic concepts of human 
rights”). 
 100 See Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Wis. 1967) (holding that in adopting the “better law” 
approach, the court is “obliged to avoid those that represent the Scylla of new jurisdiction selecting rules and 
the Charybdis of those whose latitude is so boundless as to be no guide at all. The latter, while philosophically 
sound, are of little help to the busy judge or lawyer, and the former, though tranquilizing in their assuring 
certainty, are perilously close to the ossified rules of lex loci that we have so recently rejected”). 
 101 Six jurisdictions—Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania—embrace 
a combined modern approach that incorporates elements of the other approaches. See Symeonides, supra note 
47, at 309 tbl.1. 
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common and split domiciles.102 When the parties have the same domicile, the 
court pronounces a categorical rule that the law of the common domicile 
should control the outcome of the case.103 Where the plaintiff and defendant 
have different domiciles, however, the center of gravity shifts and the courts 
apply a presumption favoring lex loci delicti, which may be overcome by 
balancing various governmental interests.104 Grafted onto this territorial 
presumption and interest analysis is a public policy escape, which may 
preclude enforcement of foreign law where the forum has sufficient interest in 
the outcome of the case.105 
In practice, the Neumeier approach means that, with split domiciles, the 
locus of the tort and resulting injury is presumptively appropriate, but courts 
can pick and choose among available governmental interests as well as New 
York public policy to apply a different law.106 In the international human rights 
context, courts applying this eclectic approach will rarely encounter common 
domiciliaries committing wrongful conduct outside their common jurisdiction. 
Most human rights cases default to Neumeier rules that presume lex loci 
delicti. 
Having briefly summarized these six distinctive choice-of-law approaches, 
the next Part examines notable instances in which these approaches have been 
applied in the international terrorism context. The success of transnational tort 
 
 102 See 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972); see also Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 
184 (3d Cir. 2000); Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Co., 952 N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (N.Y. 2011); Cooney v. Osgood 
Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1993); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 
1985). 
 103 See Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 457 (“When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the 
same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the standard of 
care which the host owes to his guest.” (quoting Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 404 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld, 
C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).  
 104 See id. at 457–58 (“2. When the driver’s conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state 
does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability 
would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the victim’s domicile. Conversely, when the 
guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into 
that state should not—in the absence of special circumstances—be permitted to interpose the law of his state as 
a defense. 3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different states, the rule is 
necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the 
accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the 
relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or 
producing great uncertainty for litigants.” (quoting Tooker, 249 N.E.2d at 404) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 105 See Edwards, 952 N.E.2d at 1043–44; Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687–88. 
 106 See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687–89. For an instance in which application of New York public policy 
controlled the result, see Begley v. City of New York, 878 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
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law to resolve international terrorism cases portends the likelihood of similar 
success with respect to other human rights claims. If international terrorism 
can be treated as garden-variety torts, there is nothing to prevent human rights 
victims of other international violations from following the example. 
III.  TERRORIST ATTACKS AS TRANSNATIONAL TORTS 
The most notable example of the application of choice-of-law principles to 
the human rights context is with respect to international terrorism. These cases 
illustrate the different choice-of-law approaches, and how those approaches 
have applied domestic and foreign tort laws to secure dozens of successful 
judgments. 
This Part begins with a detailed analysis of the District of Columbia’s 
choice-of-law approach in resolving dozens of international terrorism cases. 
The governmental interests at stake with international terrorism invariably 
dictate the choice of applicable law. It then contrasts that approach with New 
York’s eclectic approach. 
The terrorism cases are unusual in that the vast majority have been 
adjudicated in either the District of Columbia or New York, thereby limiting 
the analysis to two minority approaches. They also are unusual in that the 
governmental interests at stake are paramount and unlikely to be replicated 
with other human rights claims. Nonetheless, these cases exemplify the 
efficacy of using choice-of-law analysis and garden-variety tort laws to redress 
grave human rights abuses. 
A. Terrorism and the Governmental Interest Analysis 
In the past fifteen years, federal courts in the District of Columbia have 
applied the governmental interest analysis to award billions of dollars to 
victims of terrorism.107 They typically have done so by invoking choice-of-law 
 
 107 See infra note 176 and accompanying text. While most of these cases resulted in default judgments, 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s terrorism exception, “[n]o judgment by default shall be entered 
by a court of the United States or of a State against a foreign state . . . unless the claimant establishes his claim 
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2012); see also Oveissi v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 838–39 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 
1, 6 (D.D.C. 2011); Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 20 (D.D.C. 2009). Plaintiffs have 
the burden of establishing all elements of their claim and courts must consider all relevant defenses. Although 
Iran often does not appear as a defendant, claims have been dismissed in a number of these cases. See, e.g., 
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 230 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 359 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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principles to apply domestic tort law to redress foreign terrorist attacks. In 
most cases, the state tort law of the decedents’ domicile has controlled. Thus, 
when a suicide bomber kills Americans in Israel, Lebanon, or Nigeria, it is 
Illinois, Louisiana, or Nebraska law that is applied to hold the perpetrators 
accountable. 
The catalyst for terrorism litigation was a federal statute permitting civil 
suits against state sponsors of terrorism when that terrorism causes personal 
injury or death “by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, 
hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources . . . for such an 
act.”108 Another statute—the “Flatow Amendment”—conferred a private right 
of action against any official, employee, or agent of a state sponsor of 
terrorism.109 These statutes were a watershed moment, creating the first human 
rights exception to sovereign immunity, thereby removing the most important 
impediment to successful litigation against state sponsors of terrorism. 
For years, federal courts assumed that these statutes created a federal cause 
of action.110 In 2004, the D.C. Circuit in Cicippio-Puelo v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran found that the amendment “merely waives the immunity of a foreign state 
without creating a cause of action against it.”111 The court went further and 
held that “action[s] against officials, employees, and agents of foreign 
states . . . [were] limited to claims against those officials in their individual, as 
opposed to their official, capacities.”112 Having found that federal law only 
waived immunity and granted jurisdiction against the state, the court remanded 
the case “to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to state a 
cause of action under some other source of law, including state law.”113 
 
 108 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006) (repealed 2008). 
 109 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (2012); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 269 
(D.D.C. 2003). 
 110 See, e.g., Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269; Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell I), 
281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 193 (D.D.C. 2003), vacated, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2005); Regier v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98 (D.D.C. 2003), abrogated by Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004), superseded by statute, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, as recognized in Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 646 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2003), abrogated by 
Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d 1024; Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230–31 (D.D.C. 
2002), abrogated by Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d 1024. 
 111 353 F.3d at 1033. 
 112 Id. at 1034. 
 113 Id. at 1033, 1036. 
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Several months later, the D.C. Circuit in Acree v. Republic of Iraq clarified 
the Cicippio-Puleo ruling, emphasizing that pleading “generic common law 
torts,” such as assault and battery or wrongful death, was insufficient, and that 
a plaintiff “must identify a particular cause of action arising out of a specific 
source of law.”114 
Following Cicippio-Puleo and Acree, claimants in dozens of cases 
amended their complaints to plead violations of state or federal law. The 
federal law claims were unsuccessful because courts could not apply relevant 
federal statutes115 and were reluctant to create federal common law tort 
claims.116 The only viable alternative was to invoke choice-of-law principles 
and apply state or foreign tort law. 
The first decision following Cicippio-Puleo and Acree to address this 
choice-of-law question arose out of the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in 
Beirut, Lebanon, the first large-scale terrorist attack against the United States. 
In Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, over eighty U.S. citizens sued Iran 
and the Iranian intelligence agency for their role in the embassy bombing.117 
The court applied the District of Columbia’s governmental interest analysis to 
determine whether to apply District of Columbia, Lebanese, or plaintiffs’ 
domiciliary law.118 Among those options, the court concluded that the interests 
 
 114 Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2004), abrogated by Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 
556 U.S. 848 (2009). 
 115 The ATS foreclosed American claims and the Torture Victim Protection Act foreclosed claims against 
sovereign defendants. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F. Supp. 2d 
1, 17–19 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 116 See, e.g., Holland, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 19–20.  
 117 See Dammarell II, No. Civ.A. 01-2224JDB, 2005 WL 756090, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005); see also 
Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell III), 370 F. Supp. 2d 218, 220 (D.D.C. 2005); Dammarell 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell IV), 404 F. Supp. 2d 261, 270 (D.D.C. 2005). The original Dammarell 
decision was rendered before, and vacated by, Dammarell IV. See Dammarell I, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 
2003), vacated, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261. Dammarell II was an unpublished opinion, but its reasoning was 
expressly adopted in Dammarell III, Dammarell IV, and several other published opinions. See, e.g., Nikbin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 517 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426 (D.D.C. 2007); Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 507 F. 
Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D.D.C. 2007); Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 54 (D.D.C. 2006); 
Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2006); Bodoff v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 424 F. Supp. 2d 74, 83 (D.D.C. 2006); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F. Supp. 2d 
152, 159 (D.D.C. 2006); Holland, 496 F. Supp. at 23–24; Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
384 F. Supp. 2d 120, 132–33 (D.D.C. 2005); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113–14 
(D.D.C. 2005). 
 118 See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *18. While the District of Columbia has adopted a 
governmental interest approach, courts often add a “most significant relationship” gloss to the governmental 
interest analysis. See Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. 2007) 
(quoting Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 41 & n.18 (D.C. 1989)) (internal quotation marks 
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of the domiciliary state should prevail.119 The District of Columbia had little 
interest in the case, the court reasoned, with almost all of the plaintiffs residing 
outside the District of Columbia, the attack occurring overseas, and the 
defendants having no particular connection with the forum.120 As between 
Lebanese law and domiciliary law, the court had to balance “the strong and 
recognized interest of the domicile state in ensuring that its citizens are 
compensated for harm, and the intrinsic interest of the lex loci in deterring 
attacks within its jurisdiction.”121 The governmental interests at stake in the 
terrorist attack were decisive: 
[T]he particular characteristics of this case heighten the interests of a 
domestic forum and diminish the interest of the foreign state. The 
injuries in this case are the result of a state-sponsored terrorist attack 
on a United States embassy and diplomatic personnel. The United 
States has a unique interest in its domestic law, rather than the law of 
a foreign nation, determining damages in a suit involving such an 
attack. . . . [T]hese considerations . . . elevate the interests of the 
United States to nearly its highest point. . . . In the circumstances of 
this case . . . domestic law, and not the law of Lebanon, should 
control.122 
Other courts have followed Dammarell’s reasoning, emphasizing that state-
sponsored terrorism that targets U.S. citizens raises paramount governmental 
interests.123 These courts justify the projection of state tort law overseas based 
on the protective principle of international law, which authorizes the 
 
omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Coleman, 667 A.2d 811, 816 (D.C. 1995). The law of the 
defendants’ domicile was not considered. See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *19. As to the possible 
application of Iranian law, see Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 439 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65 n.5 (D.D.C. 2006) (“It 
is implausible to conclude that Congress would have passed § 1605(a)(7) to grant jurisdiction to federal courts 
over foreign . . . state sponsors of terrorism, only to require application of the law of such states . . . .”). 
 119 See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *19–20. 
 120 Id. at *19. Other courts depart from this reasoning and conclude that, while the District of Columbia 
shares with other U.S. jurisdictions concerns about protecting the United States’ interests abroad, the 
jurisdiction with the most significant interest is the plaintiff’s state of domicile. Reed, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 66. 
 121 Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *19. 
 122 Id. at *20. 
 123 See, e.g., Kirschenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 572 F. Supp. 2d 200, 210 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he 
law of the United States applies rather than the law of the place of the tort or any other foreign law. This is 
because the United States has a ‘unique interest’ in having its domestic law apply in cases involving terrorist 
attacks on United States citizens.”); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 384 F. Supp. 2d 120, 
133 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Like the embassy bombings that gave rise to the claims in Dammerell [sic], the state-
sponsored torturing of plaintiffs . . . is the kind of harm that the United States has a state interest in 
discouraging.”). 
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extraterritorial application of laws to redress the foreign conduct of foreign 
nationals directed against the state.124 
There are several important aspects of these decisions. First, application of 
the District of Columbia’s governmental interest analysis is unusually 
complex. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has emphasized, its 
choice-of-law analysis is a modified governmental interest approach.125 That 
approach uses the governmental interest analysis but presumes that the 
jurisdiction whose policy would be most advanced by application of its law 
will be the forum with the most significant relationship.126 With a terrorist 
attack, almost all of the contacts point toward the application of foreign law: 
the defendants are domiciled abroad, the injury and conduct occurred abroad, 
and the parties’ relationship is centered there. Thus, to the extent the most 
significant relationship is a gloss on the governmental interest analysis, one 
would think it would have received greater attention. This is particularly so in 
some contexts, such as terrorist attacks in Israel, when the interests of the lex 
loci in combating terrorism are aligned with the interests of the United 
States.127 
Second, in the typical domestic context, choice of law requires balancing 
the competing governmental interests of the several states. In these cases, by 
contrast, the courts compare the United States’ interests in applying domestic 
law with a foreign state’s interest in applying its law. The paramount 
governmental interest of the United States controls the choice-of-law 
outcome.128 The courts aggregate the national interests rather than the 
individualized interests of the several states, and conclude that those interests 
prevail over competing foreign interests. As one court noted, each of the 
several states is “part of a larger jurisdiction—the United States—and share its 
interests in an internationally-oriented choice-of-law analysis.”129 This 
 
 124 See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *20 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 402(3) (1987)); see also Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 266 (D.D.C. 
2006); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 398 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139 n.6 (D.D.C. 2005); Price, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 
133.  
 125 See Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. 2007); District of 
Columbia v. Coleman, 667 A.2d 811, 816 (D.C. 1995); Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 
40–41 (D.C. 1989). 
 126 Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt, 917 A.2d at 1117; Hercules, 566 A.2d at 41. 
 127 See generally, e.g., Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008) (involving a 
suicide bombing of a bus in Jerusalem); Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 
2006) (involving a suicide bombing in a restaurant in Jerusalem).  
 128 See Dammarell II, 2005 WL 756090, at *20. 
 129 Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 439 F. Supp. 2d 53, 66 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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approach would suggest that choice of law in the international context may 
require a different governmental interest analysis than that applied in the 
domestic context, on the theory that state tort laws are designed to protect 
national interests from foreign threats. 
Third, if the paramount governmental interest is to prevent terrorism 
directed against the United States, one would think courts would distinguish 
between terrorist attacks directed at U.S. targets from other attacks.130 Yet for 
years courts rarely distinguished between the two, applying domiciliary state 
tort law in cases involving terrorist attacks targeting the United States,131 as 
well as terrorist attacks targeting other countries such as Lebanon,132 France,133 
or Turkey.134 
Courts finally began to recognize this distinction in 2008, concluding that 
foreign law should apply in the absence of a U.S. nexus.135 For example, the 
 
 130 This is not to suggest there are no American interests at stake in such attacks. Courts could apply 
domestic tort law in such cases based on the “passive personality principle” that authorizes the regulation of 
foreign acts by foreign nationals that injure American nationals. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987). 
 131 See generally, e.g., Beer, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (applying Virginia and Ohio law to claims arising from a 
Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem); Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 575 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D.D.C. 
2008) (applying Missouri law to claims arising from the bombing of a U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia); 
Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying state law to claims 
arising from the bombing of a U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia); Greenbaum, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90 (applying 
New Jersey and California law to claims arising from a restaurant bombing in Jerusalem). 
 132 See generally, e.g., Dammarell IV, 404 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying domiciliary state law 
to claims involving a vehicle explosion at a U.S. embassy in Lebanon); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
370 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying Illinois tort law to claims arising from an embassy bombing in 
Lebanon).  
 133 See generally, e.g., Bakhtiar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 571 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2008) (granting, 
under domiciliary state tort law, damages following the assassination of an Iranian dissident in Paris). 
 134 See generally, e.g., Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 398 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying 
domiciliary state tort law to claims arising from the torture of tourists in Turkey to harm Turkish tourism, 
embarrass the Turkish government, and lure Turkish personnel into ambush). 
 135 See, e.g., Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Estate of Botvin ex 
rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 772 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he court declined to give 
dispositive weight to the victim’s nationality, as the plaintiffs and victim were domiciled in Israel at the time of 
the attacks, the attacks occurred in Israel, California’s interest arose solely from the fact that the plaintiff was 
born and briefly resided there and the plaintiffs had produced ‘no evidence that the terrorist attack was targeted 
specifically at U.S. nationals or was otherwise intended to affect the United States.’”); Wachsman ex rel. 
Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95–96 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he United States has a 
unique interest in applying its own law . . . to determine liability involved in a state-sponsored terrorist attack 
on one of its citizens, particularly when such an attack is directed against its national interests. . . . But with 
respect to wrongful death claims, Israel has a unique interest as well. . . . Here, the decedent suffered injury 
and death in Israel and lived his entire life in Israel. Thus, whether this court applies the law where decedent 
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D.C. Circuit in Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran concluded that where (1) the 
victim assassinated in Paris was not an American national, (2) the object of the 
attack was an Iranian dissident living in France, (3) there was no evidence that 
the defendants knew the victim had any American connections, and (4) there 
was no evidence that the defendants were targeting the United States, “all of 
the relevant choice-of-law factors point to the application of French law to the 
plaintiff’s claims.”136 
Finally, this analysis begs the question of which law should apply when 
terrorist attacks target the United States but the victims are foreign nationals. 
Beginning in 2011, federal courts addressing cases involving attacks on U.S. 
embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, and Tanzania applied District of Columbia 
choice-of-law principles and concluded that forum law should govern.137 
Several arguments supported this conclusion.138 First, there was no “true 
conflict” between District of Columbia law and the laws of Lebanon, Kenya, 
and Tanzania, permitting the application of forum law.139 Second, where an 
attack targets U.S. embassies, the United States has a “unique interest” in 
having domestic law instead of foreign law apply.140 Third, the interests of 
 
was domiciled at the time of his death, or the state where the injuries leading to death occurred, the law of 
Israel applies.” (citations omitted)). 
 136 Oveissi, 573 F.3d at 843.  
 137 See, e.g., Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 154–57 (D.D.C. 2011) (involving attacks 
in Kenya and Tanzania); Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(involving an attack in Lebanon). In 2008, Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to 
provide a cause of action for U.S. nationals and certain foreign nationals who were employees of the United 
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2) (2012); see also Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 
20, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2009); In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 58–60 
(D.D.C. 2009); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 646 F.3d 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). Some plaintiffs, such as foreign-national family members of victims, fell outside the scope of this 
new federal cause of action and therefore continued to pursue state tort claims. See Leibovitch v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 562, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Israeli law to a suit brought by the 
foreign-national family members of a U.S. citizen arising from a terrorist attack in Israel); Owens, 826 F. 
Supp. 2d at 151–53; Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
 138 Many of these same arguments could be applied to claims brought by U.S. nationals in cases such as 
Dammarell, with the result that District of Columbia tort law could have been applied as the rule of decision in 
those cases as well. 
 139 See Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 154–55 (“[N]o clear conflict of law is present between the laws of the 
forum (District of Columbia) and the laws of Kenya and Tanzania.”); Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 20–21 
(“[N]o clear conflict of law is present between the forum (District of Columbia) and Lebanon.”). 
 140 See Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (“The United States has a unique interest in its domestic law, rather 
than the law of a foreign nation, determining damages in a suit involving such an attack [on a U.S. embassy].” 
(quoting Dammarell II, No. Civ.A. 01-2224JDB, 2005 WL 756090, at *20 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)); Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (“[T]he ‘governmental interest’ prong of the 
District of Columbia choice of law analysis counsels against applying the law of Lebanon, or other foreign 
laws, and suggests that domestic law should control.”). 
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uniformity and efficiency supported reliance on forum law over the 
domiciliary laws of the foreign nationals.141 Finally, a “unifying factor” 
favoring the application of forum law was that “all of plaintiffs’ claims derive 
from employment with a federal agency headquartered in the District of 
Columbia, the seat of the federal government.”142 
In sum, courts applying the District of Columbia’s modified governmental 
interest analysis have reached three distinct results. While these are not 
categorical rules,143 Table 1 below represents the general parameters of the 
District of Columbia’s terrorism choice-of-law jurisprudence. First, with 
respect to U.S. nationals, courts apply the state tort law of the plaintiff’s 
domiciliary, whether or not an attack targeted the United States.144 Second, 
courts apply forum law to foreign national claims arising from a terrorist attack 
targeting the United States. Third, courts apply foreign law to foreign national 
claims arising from an attack targeting other countries. 
  
 
 141 See Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (“[A]pplying District of Columbia law will provide greater 
uniformity of result, as individual plaintiffs domiciled in different states and foreign nations will all be subject 
to the same substantive law.”); Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 22–23 (“[T]he interests of uniformity of 
decision among the foreign national family members points to the application of the law of the forum. . . . 
[E]fficiency and uniformity are appropriate and meaningful factors in a choice of law analysis.”). 
 142 Owens, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 156; Estate of Doe, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 23. 
 143 Estate of Botvin ex rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 772 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 144 If a U.S. national does not have a U.S. domicile, courts have occasionally applied forum law, see Ben-
Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39, 54 (D.D.C. 2008); Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 69 (D.D.C. 2006), and have occasionally applied foreign domiciliary law, see Botvin, 772 
F. Supp. 2d at 223–26; Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95–96 
(D.D.C. 2008).  
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B. Terrorism and the Eclectic Approach 
The District of Columbia’s approach is the most important example for 
choice-of-law principles applied to adjudicate international terrorism. There 
are, however, a few terrorism cases that have been filed elsewhere, particularly 
New York, and these cases offer a useful prism for examining how other courts 
have resolved terrorism cases using other choice-of-law approaches. 
The most sophisticated application of New York choice of law in the 
terrorism context arose from the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland.145 In the case of Pescatore v. Pan American World 
Airways, Inc., the Second Circuit had numerous laws to choose from in 
resolving the dispute: (1) Pan Am’s improper screening of luggage occurred in 
Germany or England, (2) the crash and resulting deaths occurred in Scotland, 
(3) the defendant was domiciled in New York, and (4) the plaintiff and 
decedent were domiciled in Ohio.146 It thus presented an ideal laboratory for 
testing New York’s choice-of-law approach in the terrorism context. 
 
 145 See Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 146 See id. at 13–14. 
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Applying New York’s eclectic approach, the Second Circuit recognized 
that where the injured party and the defendant had split domiciles “and the 
accident occurred in a third jurisdiction, the law of the place of the accident 
presumptively applie[d].”147 But citing Babcock v. Jackson, the court 
concluded that this presumption made no sense where “the place of the crash is 
often random . . . and the sovereignty in which the accident occurs has little 
interest in applying its substantive law to the case.”148 This is particularly so 
when the question was one of allocating loss rather than the regulation of 
conduct. “[W]here no negligence or misconduct took place in Scotland, and 
where no damages were incurred in Scotland, there is really no reason . . . why 
the compensability of the plaintiff’s damages should be governed by Scottish 
law.”149 
As between New York and Ohio law, the Second Circuit concluded that 
both jurisdictions had an interest in the case, but Ohio’s interests were 
greater.150 New York’s interest in limiting a New York corporation’s financial 
exposure was not significant in this case given an applicable federal law 
prohibiting punitive damages.151 Ohio had an obvious interest in ensuring that 
its residents were fully and adequately compensated for tortious harm—loss of 
society, loss of financial support, and loss of services—occurring in Ohio. 
Applying New York’s choice of law, Ohio tort law therefore governed.152 
A different analysis applied where the concern was to regulate conduct 
instead of allocate losses. In Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 
SAL, the Second Circuit addressed claims that American Express Bank Ltd., a 
correspondent bank of Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, provided wire transfer 
services to Hezbollah that facilitated the financing of terrorism in Israel.153 
Applying New York choice-of-law principles, the Second Circuit concluded 
that it should “give controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, 
 
 147 Id. at 13 (citing Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (N.Y. 1972)). 
 148 Id. (citing Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (1963)) (noting the “place of accident has little 
interest where it was a ‘purely adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there’” (quoting Babcock, 
191 N.E.2d at 284)). 
 149 Id. at 14. Neither German nor English law was applied because those jurisdictions were not the “place 
of the wrong,” which is determined by considering the last event necessary to make the actor liable, namely 
the injuries in Scotland. See id. at 13–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 150 Id. at 14 (finding Ohio’s “important and obvious interest in ensuring that its residents are fully and 
adequately compensated for tortious harm” outweighed New York’s minimal “interest in regulating the extent 
to which New York-centered corporations may be held liable for excessive or punitive damages”). 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id.  
 153 See 672 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the 
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.”154 Under New 
York’s eclectic approach, the court concluded that New York had the greatest 
interest in the litigation. 
All of the challenged conduct undertaken by AmEx occurred in New 
York, where AmEx is headquartered and where AmEx administers its 
correspondent banking services. Although the plaintiffs’ injuries 
occurred in Israel, and Israel is also the plaintiffs’ domicile, those 
factors do not govern where, as here, the conflict pertains to a 
conduct-regulating rule.155 
Lower courts have followed suit. In Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., a federal 
district court addressed a Chinese bank’s alleged financing of terrorism in 
Israel.156 Relying on Licci, the district court concluded that Chinese law should 
be applied to resolve the dispute. Because under Licci it is the locus of 
defendant’s conduct and not the locus of injury that controls, the court 
concluded that “China’s interest in regulating bank conduct within its borders 
is dispositive.”157 
Licci and Wultz are in tension with other cases applying New York choice 
of law to resolve claims against owners and operators of the Twin Towers 
arising from the September 11 terrorist attacks.158 The court concluded “that 
the state in which the tort took place ha[d] the strongest interest in applying its 
conduct-regulating rules.”159 New York law governed the question of whether 
owners negligently designed and maintained the Twin Towers because “New 
York ha[d] the strongest interest in applying its substantive law to define the 
issues of duty, proximate causation, and governmental immunity.”160 
 
 154 Id. at 158 (quoting Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 337 (2d Cir. 
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 155 Id. at 158. 
 156 See 865 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 157 Id. at 429. The court noted that the locus of injury may still control in the absence of a third party’s 
intervening criminal act. See id. at 429 n.28.  
 158 See In re September 11 Litig. (September 11th Litig. I), 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The 
court did not exclusively apply the forum’s choice of law because federal law consolidated September 11 
litigation in New York but mandated that the substantive law “be derived from the law, including choice of 
law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred.” See id. at 287–89 (quoting Air Transportation Safety 
and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001) (codified at 49 
U.S.C. § 40101)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 159 Id. at 289. 
 160 Id. at 299.  
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In a subsequent ruling in the same case, the court applied New York choice 
of law to determine whether punitive damages were available against the 
airline carriers and security screening companies.161 The court concluded that 
New York’s interests were predominant: 
New York was the target of the terrorists. As long as it remains the 
commercial center of . . . the world, New York will be a target for 
terrorists. . . . The attack on the World Trade Center was an attack on 
the City of New York, the State of New York, and the United 
States . . . New York . . . has the greatest interest in applying its 
conduct-regulating law.162 
Thus, although New York’s conduct-regulating choice-of-law analysis 
ordinarily might point to the application of Massachusetts law (where the 
defendants failed to properly screen the terrorists), the court concluded that 
New York’s interests in combatting terrorism prevailed over any other 
governmental interest.163 
C. Terrorism and Various Other Approaches 
Beyond the District of Columbia and New York, there have been a small 
handful of other cases that hint at how other jurisdictions might resolve 
terrorism cases. A federal court applying Virginia choice of law to the 
September 11 attacks on the Pentagon concluded without analysis that Virginia 
tort law should govern claims arising from the crash of American Flight 77 
into the Pentagon.164 Although offering little analysis, the result comports with 
Virginia’s traditional lex loci delicti reasoning, focusing on the place of injury 
as the last event necessary to render the defendants liable. 
With respect to Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law approach, the court in an 
early September 11 case focused on “the substantive law of the state having the 
most interest in the outcome of the case.”165 Applying that standard led the 
 
 161 See In re September 11th Litig. (September 11th Litig. II), 494 F. Supp. 2d 232, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 162 Id. at 239–40. It is not clear that a choice between the law of the place of the wrong (Massachusetts) 
and the place of the injury (New York) was necessary, given that neither jurisdiction allowed for punitive 
damages in this circumstance. See id.; see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts 
in 2007: Twenty-First Annual Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 255 (2008). It appears, however, that the court 
was comparing not simply those two jurisdictions, but also the various jurisdictions where the plaintiffs and 
defendants were domiciled. See September 11th Litig. II, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 241. 
 163 See September 11th Litig. II, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 240. 
 164 See September 11th Litig. I, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 290, 305; see also September 11th Litig. II, 494 F. 
Supp. 2d at 240. 
 165 September 11th Litig. I, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 305. 
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court to rely on Pennsylvania tort law to resolve claims relating to the crash of 
United 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.166 
In a subsequent case applying Pennsylvania choice of law to the question of 
whether compensatory damages were available, the court concluded that the 
law of the plaintiffs’ domicile should apply.167 Pennsylvania law should not 
govern that question because the location of the crash of United 93 was wholly 
“fortuitous.”168 While the defendants’ domicile had an interest in maintaining 
the health and vitality of its companies and protecting those companies from 
undue and unpredictable liability, the court concluded that the governmental 
interest of the plaintiffs’ domiciliary was predominant: “The interest of a 
plaintiff’s domicile state in protecting the well-being of surviving dependents 
will be fully vindicated by application of its own law.”169 
Jurisdictions that apply the most significant relationship test have addressed 
a handful of terrorism cases. That test was applied in three terrorism cases 
arising in Florida and Illinois.170 In Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
Seventh Circuit applying Illinois choice of law concluded that Israeli law 
should govern Israeli national claims against Iran for terrorism occurring in 
Israel.171 In In re Chiquita Brands International, Inc. and Saludes v. Republica 
de Cuba, federal courts in Florida concluded that the plaintiffs’ domiciliary 
law (Nebraska and Florida) should apply to claims of alleged Colombian and 
Cuban terrorism in Colombia and Cuba.172 Finally, in Estates of Ungar ex rel. 
Strachman v. Palestinian Authority a federal court in Rhode Island applying 
Rhode Island choice of law concluded that Israeli law should resolve claims 
involving terrorist attacks in Israel against American nationals domiciled in 
Israel.173 Although a “better law” jurisdiction, the court did not address which 
 
 166 Id.  
 167 See September 11th Litig. II, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 241. There was no true conflict regarding the 
availability of punitive damages among the jurisdictions with an interest in regulating defendants’ conduct. See 
id. at 241–42. 
 168 Id. at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 169 Id.  
 170 See Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 570–73 (7th Cir. 2012); In re Chiquita 
Brands Int’l, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1315–17 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Saludes v. Republica de Cuba, 577 F. 
Supp. 2d 1243, 1254 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 171 See Leibovitch, 697 F.3d at 570–73. 
 172 See In re Chiquita Brands, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1315–17; Saludes, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1254. 
 173 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82, 98–99 (D.R.I. 2001). After amending the complaint to incorporate Israeli law 
claims, the court subsequently concluded that the plaintiffs had asserted valid claims under Israeli law for, 
inter alia, negligence, assault, and various statutory violations. Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. 
Palestinian Auth., 228 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47–48 (D.R.I. 2002). 
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jurisdiction had the better law, or whether other “choice-influencing 
considerations” would have altered the result.174 
Summarizing the approaches applied by other choice-of-law jurisdictions, 
these cases suggest that courts apply the lex loci delicti presumption subject to 
several caveats. Courts will apply plaintiffs’ domiciliary law if the location of 
the attack was fortuitous or if the terrorism occurred in a jurisdiction complicit 
in the attack.175 With respect to conduct-regulating rules, courts in New York 
ordinarily will apply the law of the place of wrongful conduct, but will apply 
the law of the place of injury if New York was the target of the attack. Finally, 
it remains unclear whether these courts will apply the lex loci delicti 
presumption to foreign terrorist attacks targeting the United States. 
The complexity inherent in applying these choice-of-law approaches to 
international terrorism does not alter the simplicity of the central idea: grave 
human rights abuses have been litigated in domestic courts using conventional 
tort laws. The same approach is available for human rights abuses that 
heretofore have been resolved through ATS litigation. 
IV.  HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS TRANSNATIONAL TORTS 
Recourse to state or foreign tort law has led courts to award billions of 
dollars in judgments to victims of terrorism.176 With the demise of the ATS 
and the success of terrorism litigation, this Article posits that the time is ripe to 
reframe human rights violations as transnational torts. If so, how should choice 
of law be undertaken in the human rights context? This Part analyzes that 
question by considering how the divergent approaches might resolve choice-
of-law questions in notable human rights cases. 
 
 174 A proper analysis of Rhode Island choice of law also would have considered Leflar’s “choice-
influencing considerations”: “A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate and international order; 
C. Simplification of the judicial task; D. Advancement of the forum’s governmental interests; [and] E. 
Application of the better rule of law.” Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 282; see 
Victoria v. Smythe, 703 A.2d 619, 620–21 (R.I. 1997); Cribb v. Augustyn, 696 A.2d 285, 288 (R.I. 1997). 
 175 This conclusion can only be inferred from Saludes and In re Chiquita Brands, because neither decision 
explains why it applied plaintiff domiciliary law instead of Cuban or Colombian law. 
 176 See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing a 
multibillion dollar judgment against Iran); In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 
37 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing “10 billion dollars in currently outstanding” terrorism judgments against Iran); 
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. CV 11-80065 MISC CRB (NJV), 2011 WL 3157089, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
July 26, 2011) (reporting a “staggering 9.6 billion dollars in outstanding judgments entered against Iran in 
terrorism cases as of August 2008”). 
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A. Human Rights Test Cases 
To test how choice-of-law questions might be resolved in other human 
rights contexts, we will apply the divergent approaches outlined in Part II to 
the facts of well-known human rights cases. These cases were chosen based on 
their particular nexus to the United States. Each scenario highlights how, 
depending on the circumstances, different choice-of-law approaches would 
result in the application of foreign or state tort law. 
1. No Nexus. The first scenario arises from the facts alleged in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., discussed above. Nigerian victims alleged human 
rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention, and crimes against 
humanity, perpetrated in Nigeria by the Nigerian government with the aid and 
assistance of non-American corporate defendants.177 The Kiobel scenario 
assumes no connection to a U.S. forum, with foreign plaintiffs, foreign 
defendants, foreign misconduct, foreign injury, foreign governmental interests, 
and little or no forum interests at stake in the outcome of the proceedings.178 
2. After-Acquired Plaintiff Nexus. The second scenario arises from the facts 
alleged in Licea v. Curaçao Drydock Co.179 Cuban nationals domiciled in 
Florida alleged human rights abuses, including physical abuse, human 
trafficking, and forced labor, perpetrated in Curaçao by a Curaçaoan corporate 
 
 177 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013). There is ambiguity as to the residency status of the Kiobel plaintiffs. 
The case is a putative class action in which the named plaintiffs acquired U.S. residency after the alleged 
human rights abuses occurred, but the unnamed plaintiffs apparently remain Nigerian residents. See id.; Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013). For purposes of this Article, we treat the plaintiffs’ status as nonresidents because that is the status of 
the majority of the plaintiffs, and choice-of-law analysis must be applied to all members of a class action. See 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–23 (1985). See generally Linda Silberman, The Role of 
Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2008) (discussing how choice of law may 
influence forum selection in putative class actions).  
 178 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63. There are numerous ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, e.g., Sarei 
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Flomo v. 
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009); Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063–64 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (noting that the defendants were foreign, with the exception of one corporate defendant, an 
American subsidiary), vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (2013); Chowdhury v. 
WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Roe I v. Bridgestone, 492 F. 
Supp. 2d 988, 990–92 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (noting that the defendants were foreign, with the exception of one 
corporate defendant, an American subsidiary); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
 179 See 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356–57 (S.D. Fla. 2008); see also Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 870 F. 
Supp. 2d 1360, 1362–63 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301 (S.D. 
Fla. 2011); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
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defendant.180 The Licea scenario assumes a plaintiff-based connection to a U.S. 
forum, with foreign plaintiffs domiciled in the forum, a foreign defendant, 
foreign misconduct, foreign injury, and both foreign and forum interests in the 
outcome of the proceedings.181 
3. Defendant Nexus/Deficient Law. The third scenario arises from the facts 
alleged in Doe v. Unocal Corp.182 Burmese victims alleged human rights 
abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced relocation, 
perpetrated in Burma by the Burmese government with the aid and assistance 
of an American corporation and its officers.183 The Unocal scenario assumes a 
defendant-based connection to a U.S. forum, with foreign plaintiffs, American 
defendants, foreign misconduct, foreign injury, and both foreign and forum 
interests in the outcome of the proceedings.184 The Unocal scenario further 
assumes a foreign law that is seriously deficient or unknowable, and that 
foreign governmental interests are illegitimate or contrary to traditional norms 
for wrongful conduct applied by the community of nations.185 
4. Defendant and Conduct Nexus. The fourth scenario arises from the facts 
alleged in Abagninin v. Amvac Chemical Corp.186 Ivory Coast victims alleged 
human rights abuses, including genocide and crimes against humanity, 
perpetrated by American corporations by knowingly designing, developing, 
 
 180 Licea, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1362–63. 
 181 See id. There are other ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, e.g., Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 850 F. Supp. 
2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In some respects Kiobel fits this pattern because the named plaintiffs are 
Nigerian refugees located in the United States. See supra text accompanying note 177. In other cases, 
including well-known cases such as Hilao and Filartiga, both the plaintiffs and defendants acquired residency 
in the United States after the torts occurred. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 791 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 182 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936–97 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 
(9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 183 See id. 
 184 There are numerous ATS cases that fit this pattern, at least with respect to a defendant-based nexus to 
the United States. See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 14–15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 
527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2009); Flores v. S. 
Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2003); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 
2002); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 443 (2d Cir. 2001); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 
161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (2008), aff’d, 621 F.3d 1116 
(9th Cir. 2010). Unocal differs from most of these other cases in that Burmese law is seriously deficient or 
unknowable. See infra text accompanying note 185. Unocal is similar to some of these other cases in that the 
foreign government’s interests may be illegitimate and out of step with the community of nations. 
 185 See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 959. 
 186 See 545 F.3d 733, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 950–51 
(9th Cir. 2009) (concerning the same allegations of misconduct by the Dow Chemical Company in Ivory 
Coast). 
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and manufacturing in the United States various toxic pesticides that were 
banned in the United States and that caused sterility when used in banana and 
pineapple plantations in Ivory Coast.187 The Abagninin scenario assumes a 
defendant-based and conduct-based connection to a U.S. forum, with foreign 
plaintiffs, domestic defendants, domestic misconduct, foreign injury, and both 
foreign and forum interests in the outcome of the proceedings.188 
5. Plaintiff and Defendant Nexus. The fifth scenario arises from the facts 
alleged in Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc.189 American and Palestinian nationals 
alleged human rights abuses, including war crimes and extrajudicial killings, 
perpetrated by the Israeli Defense Forces and an American corporation 
following the demolition of Palestinian homes in Gaza using custom-made 
armored bulldozers manufactured in the United States.190 The Corrie scenario 
assumes a plaintiff-based and defendant-based connection to a U.S. forum, 
with at least one domestic plaintiff, a domestic defendant, foreign misconduct, 
foreign injury, and both foreign and forum interests in the outcome of the 
proceedings.191 
6. Conduct, Injury, and Defendant Nexus. The sixth scenario arises from 
facts alleged in Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc.192 Foreign nationals 
alleged human rights abuses, including torture and cruel and inhumane 
treatment, perpetrated by an American corporation at an immigration 
deportation detention facility in New Jersey.193 The Jama scenario assumes a 
 
 187 Abagninin, 545 F.3d at 735–36. 
 188 Id. Although less common than other fact patterns, there are other ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, 
e.g., Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2008); Bano v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696, 702 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 189 See 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See id. There are other ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce 
N.A., 578 F.3d 1283, 1286–87, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009); Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Jean v. Dorélien, 431 F.3d 776, 777–78, 783 (11th Cir. 2005); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790–
91 (9th Cir. 1996); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845–46 (11th Cir. 1996); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). Aldana is unusual in that the plaintiffs and defendants had a common domicile in 
Florida, although the plaintiffs acquired it after the torts occurred. See Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1293, 1303. In 
Arce, Jean, Hilao, Abebe-Jira, and Filartiga, the plaintiffs and defendants acquired residency in the United 
States after the torts were committed. See Arce, 434 F.3d at 1256; Jean, 431 F.3d at 779; Hilao, 103 F.3d at 
791; Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 846; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. In Jean, Hilao, and Abebe-Jira, that after-acquired 
jurisdiction was common between the parties, namely Florida, Hawaii, and Georgia, respectively. See Jean, 
431 F.3d at 783; Hilao, 103 F.3d at 791; Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 846. 
 192 See 577 F.3d 169, 171–72 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Jama v. U.S. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345–46 
(D.N.J. 2004); Jama v. U.S. INS, 334 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666 (D.N.J. 2004); Jama v. U.S. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 
353, 358 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 193 See Jama, 577 F.3d at 171. 
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conduct-based, injury-based, and defendant-based connection to a U.S. forum, 
with foreign plaintiffs, a domestic defendant, domestic misconduct, domestic 
injury, and both foreign and forum interests in the outcome of the 
proceedings.194 
These six factual scenarios highlight typical facts in current human rights 
litigation. In each scenario, the nexus to the forum adjudicating the dispute is 
different, allowing one to test how each choice-of-law approach might assess 
the appropriate application of substantive tort law.195 The tentative summary 
that follows suggests how complicated such a choice-of-law analysis might be. 
The result is the application of either domestic or foreign tort law, depending 
on the approach applied to the given facts. 
These fact patterns are necessarily incomplete. They do not address some 
of the fact patterns discussed in traditional domestic choice-of-law 
commentary.196 This omission is deliberate, reflecting the absence of such fact 
patterns in typical international human rights litigation. It is rare in human 
rights litigation, for example, that the plaintiff and defendant will have a 
common domicile but that the wrongful conduct and injury will occur outside 
their common domicile. Nor do these fact patterns fit the typical scenarios 
outlined in the terrorism context above. It is rare in human rights litigation for 
the defendant to commit human rights violations with the political objective of 
injuring the United States. 
B. Human Rights and the Most Significant Relationship Approach 
The most significant relationship test gives courts significant flexibility. To 
the extent courts apply the lex loci delicti presumption seriously, most of the 
six factual scenarios are easily resolved.197 As discussed below, lex loci delicti 
results in the application of foreign tort law in at least four of the six factual 
 
 194 See id. There are other ATS cases that fit this pattern. See, e.g., Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 314–
15 (2d Cir. 2012); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 128–30 (2d Cir. 2010); Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 
767, 769–70 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe I v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570 WHA, 2003 WL 23893010, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 4, 2003). In some respects Sosa is similar to this fact pattern, although the events occurred both abroad 
and within the United States and the defendants were government officials, thereby raising federal question 
jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2004).  
 195 In terms of nomenclature, I will use “foreign law” to refer to tort laws outside the United States and 
“domestic law” to refer to tort laws within the United States. 
 196 See, e.g., SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 138–39 (2008) 
(outlining “Typical Fact–Law Patterns” in interstate disputes). 
 197 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146, 156, 175 (1971). 
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scenarios, and perhaps a fifth depending on whether a court would refuse to 
apply Burmese law based on a public policy exception.198 
Of course, the territorial presumption is only the starting point. That 
presumption may be overcome based on balancing the various Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws “contacts” and “factors.”199 As applied, the 
contacts set forth in Restatement section 145 generally favor the application of 
lex loci delicti in all six scenarios. With the exception of Jama, all the injuries 
occurred abroad. With the exception of Abagninin and Jama, all the wrongful 
conduct occurred abroad. In none of the six scenarios do the parties have 
common domiciles, although the plaintiffs and defendants in Corrie and Licea 
have domestic (albeit split) domiciles.200 The parties’ relationship in all six 
scenarios was centered in the same place where the tort occurred. Thus, the 
balance of contacts under Restatement section 145 does not alter the territorial 
presumption. 
Reliance on Restatement section 6 factors is more complicated. These 
factors permit governmental interests and other principles to weigh in the 
balance, with no particular guidance as to the balance among the factors. As 
discussed in Part III, courts may rely on governmental interests to apply 
domestic laws to resolve disputes involving foreign torts.201 Unlike the 
terrorism context, the United States is not the target of abuse in any of the six 
factual scenarios, and therefore the governmental interests will flow from each 
jurisdiction’s relationship to the conduct, injury, and parties. 
The other Restatement section 6 factors are more nebulous, focusing on the 
needs of the international system; the policies of the particular field of law; 
 
 198 See infra text accompanying notes 200–14.  
 199 The nonexhaustive list of contacts includes the following: “(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) 
the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the 
parties is centered.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971). The seven factors are 
the following:  
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) 
the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic 
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, 
and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.  
Id. § 6(2). 
 200 The domestic connection is attenuated in Licea because the plaintiffs moved to Florida after the tort 
occurred. See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 201 See supra text accompanying notes 107–44. 
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certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and ease of determination of 
the applicable law.202 Based on these factors, courts may overcome the lex loci 
presumption by relying on Restatement section 6 factors rather than the 
Restatement section 145 contacts. 
Under the facts of Kiobel, there is no connection to any U.S. forum and no 
forum interest in the dispute. None of the parties or events have a nexus to the 
forum, making it difficult to discern a forum interest. Other jurisdictions—
particularly Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—all have 
legitimate interests in the outcome of the dispute.203 The needs of the 
international system favor outcomes that “further harmonious relations 
between states and [that] facilitate commercial intercourse between them.”204 
Holding a foreign corporation accountable under Nigerian law for conduct in 
Nigeria that injures Nigerians advances those concerns. Tort law is designed to 
deter accidents and pursue corrective justice,205 and those policies are 
advanced by the choice of a sophisticated and robust torts regime. 
Predictability and uniformity of results favor the application of Nigerian law, 
in that the outcome of claims by Nigerians for torts committed in Nigeria 
should not depend on the nationality of the tortfeasor. The ease of 
determination and application of the law to be applied might favor domestic 
law over foreign law, but as among Dutch, English, or Nigerian law, the 
burden is not dissimilar. Thus, while not every factor favors Nigerian law, the 
Restatement section 6 factors, on balance, support the lex loci presumption. 
The analysis in Unocal adds a number of new factors to the analysis. The 
defendant is an American corporation based in California, which generates 
 
 202 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2). 
 203 Nigeria’s interests relate to regulating conduct within its territory, remedying harms occurring within 
its territory, protecting its residents from wrongful conduct, and potentially immunizing corporations acting in 
concert with government tortfeasors. The Dutch and English interests flow out of those jurisdictions’ 
relationships with the defendant corporation. 
 204 SYMEONIDES, supra note 196, at 104 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. 
d) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 205 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26–31 (1970) 
(identifying the reduction of the cost of accidents as the primary goal of tort law); WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1 (1987) (emphasizing efficient resource 
allocation as the primary goal of tort law); Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68 (2010) (highlighting the compensation of harm caused as the primary goal of tort 
law); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 325 (1992) (discussing corrective justice and the duties 
it imposes); Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1243 (1988) (book review) 
(emphasizing deterrence as a function of tort law). 
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governmental interests not present in Kiobel.206 Burma’s governmental 
interests are complicated because historically the authoritarian regime has 
displayed little concern for its people and the wrongful conduct relates to 
alleged corporate collusion with government abuse.207 Burma’s interests may 
favor corporate immunity over accountability, but a court is unlikely to credit 
such interests. The content of Burmese law is unknowable,208 making its 
application difficult, and any results uncertain and unpredictable. The absence 
of any discernible Burmese tort law does nothing to advance the policies that 
underlie modern tort law. Finally, given Burma’s status in the international 
order (at least until recently), the choice of a particular law will not measurably 
alter the difficult relationship that Burma has with the outside world. On 
balance, the Restatement section 6 factors favor the application of domestic 
law over Burmese law, with forum law or the defendant’s home jurisdiction 
(California) the most plausible candidates. 
As for Licea, the plaintiffs have an attenuated connection to Florida based 
on their current residency,209 but no other Restatement section 6 factor is 
sufficient to overcome the territorial presumption. Applying Curaçaoan law 
advances the needs of the international system. The result in the case should 
not depend on where the plaintiffs reside following the commission of the tort, 
and the application of Florida law would openly invite forum shopping. On 
balance these factors do not favor displacement of the lex loci delicti. 
Corrie presents the additional factor of whether a forum’s nexus to the 
plaintiff or defendant should heighten the governmental interest analysis.210 
Both Corrie’s domicile (Washington) and Caterpillar’s domicile (Illinois) have 
a legitimate interest in the outcome of the dispute, but those interests are 
advanced by the application of Israeli law. Israeli law represents a 
 
 206 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 
(9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 207 For a general description of the history of Burma’s authoritarian regime, see MARTIN SMITH, BURMA: 
INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY (1991). 
 208 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (Ruling on Defendants’ Choice of Law Motions), Nos. BC 237980, BC 
237679, slip op. at 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 30, 2003) (“[T]his court agrees . . . that the law of Burma is 
‘radically indeterminate.’”); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237980, BC 237679, 2002 WL 33944505 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. June 10, 2002) (ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 
Nos. BC 237980, BC 237679 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 7, 2002), available at http://dg5vd3ocj3r4t.cloudfront.net/ 
sites/default/files/legal/Unocal-Tort-Liability-MSA-Ruling.pdf (ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment); Andrew Huxley, Note, Comparative Law Aspects of the Doe v. Unocal Choice of Law Hearing, 1 
J. COMP. L. 219, 220–21 (2006). 
 209 See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 210 See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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sophisticated common law tort system with British roots that would achieve 
the same results as the application of Washington or Illinois law.211 Unless a 
court focuses on the common nationality of the parties,212 no other Restatement 
section 6 factor would alter the territorial presumption favoring Israeli law. 
The Restatement section 6 analysis in Abagninin is complicated by the fact 
that the commission of the tort occurred in California and the resulting injuries 
occurred in Ivory Coast.213 A Restatement (Second) jurisdiction would likely 
recognize California’s legitimate interest in regulating a California 
corporation’s wrongful conduct within its borders. Ivory Coast has a strong 
interest in remedying injuries caused to its citizens within its borders, but those 
interests may be advanced by the application of California’s robust products 
liability law. The forum would also find California law easier to determine and 
apply, and it would find that California’s products liability laws are well suited 
to advance the objectives of modern tort laws. While other Restatement section 
6 factors may favor Ivory Coast law, the balance of factors would likely result 
in a court’s preference for California over Ivory Coast law. 
With Jama, none of the Restatement section 6 factors favor displacement of 
the territorial presumption. The smooth functioning of the international system 
is enhanced by the application of New Jersey law to regulate New Jersey–
based conduct that caused New Jersey–based injuries. New Jersey has a strong 
governmental interest in regulating wrongful conduct within its borders. 
General tort policies are advanced by the application of a sophisticated torts 
regime, which creates incentives for avoiding accidents but also immunizes 
government contractors acting within the scope of their authority.214 
Application of New Jersey law to all the parties promotes predictable, uniform 
results. There is no difficulty in discerning the content of New Jersey law. All 
the factors point toward the application of New Jersey law. 
In sum, a jurisdiction applying the majority approach would result in the 
application of foreign law in Kiobel, Licea, and Corrie, and the application of 
domestic tort law in Unocal, Abagninin, and Jama. 
 
 211 See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1030–31 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 212 See Miller v. White, 702 A.2d 392, 396 (Vt. 1997) (“In the international sphere, it is generally 
considered appropriate to apply the laws of the domiciliary forum to tort claims that involve the residents of a 
single country, regardless of where the tort took place.”). 
 213 See Abagninin v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 214 See Jama v. U.S. INS, 334 F. Supp. 2d 662, 686–88 (D.N.J. 2004). 
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C. Applying the Lex Loci Delicti Approach 
With lex loci delicti, there must be an injury-based connection to the forum 
for forum law to apply.215 The ten jurisdictions that apply lex loci delicti216 
would have little difficulty applying the appropriate choice of law under five of 
the six models outlined above. In Kiobel, Licea, Unocal, Abagninin, and 
Corrie, the injuries occurred abroad and therefore foreign substantive tort law 
should be applied to resolve the dispute. Consequently, Nigerian, Curaçaoan, 
Burmese, Ivory Coast, and Israeli law, respectively, would apply to resolve the 
disputes. Given the all-important question of the place of injury, it is irrelevant 
that tortious conduct in Abagninin occurred in the United States. Conversely, 
in Jama the resulting injuries occurred in New Jersey, and therefore the 
applicable substantive tort law would be New Jersey law. 
The only significant question in applying the lex loci delicti approach is 
whether a public policy exception might preclude the application of foreign 
law. Doing so would require a showing that the application of foreign law 
would violate good morals or natural justice, or offend fundamental principles 
of justice in the forum.217 Such a public policy invocation would be a rare 
event among the civilized nations of the world.218 Under the facts alleged in 
Unocal, for example, applying Burmese law to resolve claims against 
corporate collusion with the Burmese government may foreclose any remedy 
and offend the forum’s public policy. 
However, the public policy exception typically is used negatively to refuse 
enforcement of a foreign right, not offensively to create a cause of action that 
does not exist at the place of the wrong.219 There are, of course, exceptions,220 
 
 215 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 cmt. c (1971) (“The rule of this Section 
calls for application of the local law of the state where the injury occurred unless, with respect to the particular 
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”). 
 216 The ten jurisdictions are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See supra text accompanying notes 69–75. 
 217 See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 201–02 (N.Y. 1918); Rauton v. Pullman 
Co., 191 S.E. 416, 422 (S.C. 1937). 
 218 See Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. 
REV. 969, 1015–16 (1956) (“If the foreign law normally applicable violates the strongest moral convictions or 
appears profoundly unjust at the forum, the law should not be applied. . . . Yet such cases, between countries 
of the civilized world and certainly between the states, will be few indeed.”); see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 498 A.2d 605, 617 (Md. 1985). 
 219 See Loucks, 120 N.E. at 200–02 (“A tort committed in one state creates a right of action that may be 
sued upon in another unless public policy forbids. That is the generally accepted rule in the United States. . . . 
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual 
notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental 
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and a court that is willing to use the public policy exception offensively may 
conclude that forum law should prevail. In the actual facts of Unocal, a state 
court judge did precisely that, concluding that “to the extent Burma law 
precludes Plaintiffs’ tort claims in this case, specifically the forced labor 
claims, this court invokes the public policy exception to the traditional choice 
of law rules.”221 
If courts use the public policy exception both offensively and defensively, 
then recourse to the lex loci delicti approach would result in the application of 
foreign law in four of the scenarios—Kiobel, Licea, Abagninin, and Corrie—
and domestic law in two of the scenarios—Unocal and Jama. 
D. Applying the Governmental Interest Approach 
With the governmental interest approach there are two major variants: the 
comparative impairment version that balances competing governmental 
interests, and the lex fori version that gives presumptive weight to the forum’s 
interest.222 
1. Comparative Impairment. With the comparative impairment approach 
applied in California and the District of Columbia, forum law will apply (1) if 
the forum has an interest in the dispute and the laws of the other jurisdiction 
are not different or (2) when the laws are different and the forum’s interests 
would be more impaired than the interests of the other jurisdictions.223 As 
noted above, the focus with comparative impairment is not which law 
manifests the “better or the worthier social policy,” but rather “which state’s 
interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of 
 
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common 
weal.”); SYMEONIDES, supra note 196, at 84; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts 
in 1998: Twelfth Annual Survey, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 327, 339–40 (1999); James Audley McLaughlin, Conflict 
of Laws: The Choice of Law Lex Loci Doctrine, the Beguiling Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W. 
VA. L. REV. 957, 984 (1990). 
 220 See, e.g., Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 386, 390 (N.M. 1995); Willey v. Bracken, 719 S.E.2d 714, 721 (W. 
Va. 2010). 
 221 See Ruling on Defendants’ Choice of Law Motions, Nos. BC 237980, BC 237679, slip op. at 10 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. July 30, 2003). The judge also stated that“[f]oreign laws will not be given effect when contrary to 
the public policy of California.” Id. (quoting Severn v. Adidas Sportschuhfabriken, 33 Cal. App. 3d 754, 763 
(1973)). Furthermore, the judge noted that “[t]his public policy exception applies where the ‘foreign law is so 
offensive to our public policy as to be prejudicial to recognized standards of morality and to the general 
interests of the citizens.’” Id. (quoting Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 39 Cal. 3d 126, 135 (1985)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 222 See supra text accompanying notes 82–89. 
 223 See supra text accompanying notes 86–89. 
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the other state.”224 This test is particularly difficult to apply in the human rights 
context, given that in some circumstances the foreign government’s interests 
are an illegitimate attempt to avoid the consequences of its own misconduct. 
In all six of the factual scenarios, the governmental interests at stake are not 
as paramount as the interests at stake in the terrorism cases outlined in Part III 
above. Neither the United States, nor any of the several states, are the target of 
the human rights violations. By definition, terrorism is intended to influence 
government conduct or policies.225 Other human rights violations, by contrast, 
typically do not target governments. A court is unlikely to subordinate the 
interests of the United States in the international terrorism context, whereas in 
other human rights contexts the governmental interest of the United States or 
the several States will be more limited. 
Applying this approach to the facts in Kiobel, the forum has no 
governmental interest in applying its law because there is no nexus whatsoever 
to the forum. In the absence of such an interest, there is a false conflict226 and 
therefore no need to analyze whether the laws of the affected jurisdictions are 
different, or to undertake a comparative impairment analysis. Accordingly, 
courts would apply British, Dutch, or Nigerian law. 
With the other five scenarios, the forum has some interest in the dispute, 
and therefore an initial inquiry is required as to whether the forum’s law differs 
from the laws of other affected jurisdictions. If not, then forum law would 
apply; if so, then a comparative impairment analysis would be required. 
In Licea, because the plaintiffs were not domiciliaries at the time of the 
tort,227 Florida’s interests are diminished, although one could argue that Cuban 
mistreatment of its citizens creates harmful effects within Florida resulting 
from Cuban mass migration. Cuba’s interests are to avoid liability, with Cuban 
nationals alleging corporate collusion with the Cuban government to commit 
 
 224 McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516, 533 (Cal. 2010) (quoting Kearney v. Salomon Smith 
Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 225 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012) (defining “international terrorism” in part as violent acts intended 
“to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion . . . or . . . affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”). 
 226 See Kearney, 137 P.3d at 924 (suggesting a “false conflict” to be a situation where “there is . . . no 
problem in choosing the applicable rule of law where only one of the states has an interest in having its law 
applied” (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 670 (Cal. 1974)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). 
 227 See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
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human rights abuses.228 A court is unlikely to credit such concerns. With the 
forum having no other interest at stake, Curaçaoan law would apply based on 
that jurisdiction’s paramount interest in curtailing human trafficking within its 
borders. 
With the facts of Unocal, California’s principal governmental interest is 
regulating the behavior of a California corporation, which likely would be 
sufficient to apply California law.229 A California court is unlikely to take 
cognizance of Burma’s interest in protecting corporations that aid and abet 
Burmese government abuse, or prioritize that interest over California’s 
interests. In addition, the inability to determine the content of Burma’s tort law 
would likely preclude the application of Burmese law.230 
As for Corrie, the decedent was a Washington resident, the defendant is an 
Illinois domiciliary, and all the relevant conduct and injuries occurred in 
Israel.231 A comparative impairment jurisdiction would have the unenviable 
task of determining whether Israel’s interests in regulating its affairs in Gaza 
are a legitimate effort to shield government contractors from liability and if so, 
whether those interests should be subordinated to Washington’s interest in 
protecting its residents or Illinois’s interest in regulating its corporate 
defendants. In the actual facts of Corrie, the federal court resolved the question 
by concluding that under any applicable tort law Corrie’s claim would fail.232 
A false conflict would avoid the need for a choice-of-law analysis. In the 
absence of a false conflict, a court would likely conclude that Israel’s interest 
in controlling its affairs in Gaza during the second intifada should not be 
subordinated to the governmental interests of either Washington or Illinois. 
 
 228 See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 229 See Bowoto v. Chevron, Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 
2006) (noting “California has an interest in ensuring that its corporation behave in an appropriate manner. This 
interest is magnified by the seriousness of the allegations brought against defendants” (citation omitted)); 
Hurtado, 522 P.2d at 672 (“[W]hen the defendant is a resident of California and the tortious conduct giving 
rise to the wrongful death action occurs here, California’s deterrent policy of full compensation is clearly 
advanced by application of its own law.”); Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations in State Court 
Human Rights Actions, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 45, 50 (2013) (“The best hope for applying the forum state’s law 
would be if one or more of the parties were a citizen of the forum state—perhaps a corporate defendant with its 
headquarters in the forum state. In such a case, one could make a reasonable argument that applying the forum 
state’s tort law would serve a deterrent interest and thus justify application of forum law.”). 
 230 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.  
 231 See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022–23 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 232 See id. at 1030–31. 
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With Abagninin, California has a strong interest in regulating the conduct 
of its corporate citizens that occurs in whole or in part within its borders.233 
Ivory Coast has a strong interest in regulating foreign investment and 
protecting its citizens from toxic pesticides, but those interests are unlikely to 
be impaired by the application of California law, which generally would favor 
plaintiffs in disputes relating to product design and manufacturing defects. 
Applying a comparative impairment approach would result in the application 
of California law. 
The strongest governmental interest would arise from facts similar to Jama, 
with the government’s interest triggered by the defendant’s domicile, the 
tortious conduct, and the resulting injury.234 The only other potential 
jurisdictions that have an interest in the dispute are the plaintiffs’ domiciles, 
but those interests would be advanced by the application of robust New Jersey 
tort law. Under the facts of Jama, a comparative impairment analysis would 
require the application of New Jersey tort law. 
Thus applying the comparative impairment variant, in almost all of the 
factual scenarios a law other than forum law would apply to resolve the 
dispute. In some cases—Kiobel, Licea, and Corrie—this likely would result in 
the application of foreign law. In other cases—Abagninin, Unocal, and Jama—
some version of domestic tort law would apply, based on a nexus to the 
plaintiff, defendant, conduct, or injury. 
2. Lex Fori. The lex fori variant requires either a defendant-based, plaintiff-
based, conduct-based, or injury-based connection to the forum to create the 
requisite governmental interest in applying forum law. With the lex fori 
version applied in Kentucky and Michigan, forum law is presumptively applied 
unless the forum’s connection to the dispute is simply too remote.235 Where the 
tort occurred outside the jurisdiction and no party had a connection to the 
forum, the presumption favoring forum law typically will be overcome. In the 
absence of forum interest, a court would apply the law with the greatest 
governmental interest in the dispute. 
Applying this approach, there is no reason to apply lex fori in the Kiobel 
scenario because the connection to the forum is simply too remote, none of the 
constituent acts occurred in the forum, and none of the parties have any 
 
 233 See Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761, at *10; cf. Hurtado, 522 P.2d at 669–74. 
 234 See Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 235 See supra text accompanying notes 82–85. 
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connection to the forum. Therefore, the choice-of-law analysis would require 
the application of another substantive law, presumably British, Dutch, or 
Nigerian law. 
The other scenarios require further explanation. Under the lex fori 
approach, as long as there is some significant connection with the forum, then 
its law should apply, even if other jurisdictions have a closer connection to the 
dispute. Thus, assuming the American defendants in the Unocal, Abagninin, 
Corrie, or Jama scenarios were incorporated, had their principal places of 
business, or resided in the forum, the lex fori law should apply. Likewise, if the 
plaintiffs in Corrie or Licea resided in the forum, that too would be 
sufficient.236 Further, if some of the tortious conduct in Abagninin or Jama 
occurred within the forum—the detention facility in Jama was located there, or 
the pesticides in Abagninin were designed and manufactured there—that likely 
would be sufficient to apply the lex fori law. Finally, if the resulting injury in 
Jama occurred within the forum, that almost certainly would be sufficient to 
apply forum law. 
In the actual facts of these cases, none of the parties or events had any 
connection to either Michigan or Kentucky that would trigger the forum’s 
interests. Therefore these lex fori jurisdictions would apply the law of the 
jurisdiction that had the greatest interest in the case. As with the comparative 
impairment approach, the result would be the application of foreign law in 
Kiobel, Licea, and Corrie and the application of domestic law in Abagninin, 
Unocal, and Jama. 
E. Applying the “Better Law” Approach 
With the “better law” approach, courts may pursue individual justice in 
particular cases by choosing the right set of rules.237 Courts are free to consider 
the quality of the available laws and apply the law that achieves the desired 
outcome.238 But the “better law” approach is complex and considers other 
factors besides which law achieves individual justice. These factors include the 
“A. Predictability of results; B. Maintenance of interstate and international 
 
 236 To the extent plaintiffs established domicile in the forum after the tort occurred, as was the case in 
Licea, that likely will be perceived as a more distant and insufficient connection to the forum. See supra text 
accompanying notes 179–81. 
 237 The states that use this approach are Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Wisconsin. See supra text accompanying notes 92–100. 
 238 See supra text accompanying notes 92–94. 
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order; C. Simplification of the judicial task; [and] D. Advancement of the 
forum’s governmental interests.”239 
Applying the “better law” approach to the factual scenarios, a court 
engaging in a “better law” analysis in Kiobel would likely conclude that there 
is no significant connection between the forum and the dispute, such that a 
false conflict exists and forum law is not among the choices available. 
Although forum law is clearly better in certain respects,240 the absence of a 
nexus between the dispute and the forum would preclude recourse to forum 
law.241 That would leave either Nigerian law or the law of the defendants’ 
domicile, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. Under any “better law” 
scenario, in a case such as Kiobel the forum will be forced to decide among 
competing foreign laws. 
As for the facts of Licea, Curaçaoan law is based on the Netherlands’ civil 
law system, which recognizes intentional and negligent torts.242 Thus, a claim 
of torture or arbitrary detention would be actionable as unlawful conduct 
attributable to corporate or individual tortfeasors.243 Because both Curaçaoan 
law and forum law provide effective relief for the claims alleged in Licea, it is 
 
 239 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 93, at 282. 
 240 Nigerian tort law requires that a plaintiff prove the charge of battery beyond a reasonable doubt, while 
intentional torts in the United States require proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Okuarume v. 
Obabokor, [1965] NSCC 286, 287 (Nigeria), discussed in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1128–29 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 241 See Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 71 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Ark. 2002) (applying the “better law” 
approach, where the forum did not have a sufficient relationship to the dispute, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
declined to apply Arkansas law with a longer statute of limitations period to resolve a dispute between non-
domiciliary plaintiff and non-domiciliary defendant involving death that occurred outside the forum). 
 242 See Brief for Professor Alex-Geert Castermans et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. at 8–10, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2312828 [hereinafter 
Amicus Curiae] (citing C. ASSERS, A.S. HARTKAMP & C.H. SIEBURGH, C. ASSERS HANDLEIDING TOT DE 
BEOEFENING VAN HET NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK RECHT, DEEL 6–IV: VERBINTENISSENRECHT. DE 
VERBINTENIS UIT DE WET §§ 38–166 (A.S. Hartkamp & C.H. Sieburgh eds., 13th ed. 2011); C.C. VAN DAM, 
AANSPRAKELIJKHEIDSRECHT §§ 801–923 (2000)); see also THE CIVIL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS 677 (Hans 
Warendorf et al. trans., 2009) (translating bk. 6, tit. 3, art. 162 of the code to mean that “[a] person who 
commits a tort against another which is attributable to him, must repair the damage suffered by the other in 
consequence thereof”); THE CIVIL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AND ARUBA 295 (Peter Haanappel et 
al. trans., 2002) (translating bk. 6, tit. 3, art. 162 of the code to provide for the same tort liability as the 
Netherlands’ code).  
 243 See Amicus Curiae, supra note 242, at 10–11 (noting that civil courts in the Netherlands assert 
jurisdiction over cases concerning international human rights violations) (citing Hof ’s-Gravenhage 5 juli 
2011, 200.020.174/01 (Mothers of Srebrenica/ Netherlands) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 21 maart 2012, 
400882/HA ZA 11-2252 (El-Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 14 september 2011, NJF 2011, 427 
(Silan/Netherlands) (Neth.) Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 24 februari 2010, 337050/HA ZA 09-1580, BM 1469 
(Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell) (Neth.)). 
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doubtful that a “better law” jurisdiction would conclude that either is better. 
Other factors, such as predictability and maintenance of international order, 
likely favor application of Curaçaoan law, while factors such as the 
simplification of the judicial task and advancing the forum’s governmental 
interests likely favor forum law. Given the other relevant connections to 
Curaçao, a “better law” jurisdiction would likely apply Curaçaoan law. 
The facts of Unocal raise the distinct possibility that the “better law” 
approach would lead to the application of domestic law. As noted above, 
Burmese tort law is difficult to identify, with few primary or secondary 
materials outlining the basic contours of the law. One can scarcely have 
confidence in the proper application of Burmese law if that law is 
indecipherable. Moreover, there are few cases interpreting the law. The State 
Department’s Burma 2012 Human Rights Report depicts a judicial system that 
is “seriously flawed,” with “no reported examples of successful attempts” to 
use either criminal or civil law to remedy human rights violations.244 This 
comports with a California state court judge’s findings in Unocal that Burmese 
law is inaccessible.245 As such, it is highly unlikely that a court applying the 
“better law” approach would find chimerical foreign law superior to forum 
law. 
The “better law” approach as applied to the facts of Abagninin presents the 
difficult question of whether international human rights law might directly 
apply to resolve the dispute because Ivory Coast is a monist state.246 As such, 
international treaties are automatically incorporated in the domestic order with 
a status above national legislation.247 In the absence of applicable international 
 
 244 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, 2012 COUNTRY REPORTS 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: BURMA 8–10 (2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
204400.pdf. 
 245 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 246 Monism is the view “that international and domestic law are part of the same legal order, international 
law is automatically incorporated into each nation’s legal system, and international law is supreme over 
domestic law.” Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999). 
 247 See CONSTITUTION DE LA CÔTE D’IVOIRE July 23, 2000, tit. 6, art. 87 (“Les Traités ou Accords 
régulièrement ratifiés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour 
chaque Traité ou Accord, de son application par l’autre partie.”), translated in WORLD CONSTITUTIONS 
ILLUSTRATED: CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE, 2000, at 15 (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., 2010) 
(“The Treaties or Agreements regularly ratified have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the 
laws, provided, for each Treaty or Agreement, that it is applied by the other party.”); see also Armand Tanoh 
& Horace Adjolohoun, International Law and Human Rights Litigation in Côte d’Ivoire and Benin, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN AFRICA 109, 110–14 (Magnus Killander 
ed., 2010).  
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law, Ivory Coast follows the French Civil Code with respect to torts.248 Thus, a 
court applying the better law would be forced to decide whether French-based 
tort law, together with international human rights law incorporated into Ivory 
Coast law, might serve the ends of justice better than California law. Given the 
centrality of the products liability claims in Abagninin, combined with other 
choice-influencing factors, a court is likely to determine that California law 
should apply as the better law. 
The choice of the better law in Corrie is fact intensive, based on disputed 
questions relating to contributory negligence, proximate causation, 
comparative fault, assumption of risk, and joint and several liability. A “better 
law” analysis would weigh such legal elements to reach the proper conclusion 
as to the just result.249 A court in a “better law” jurisdiction is unlikely to 
determine that Israeli law is inferior or antiquated compared to the forum’s tort 
law.250 As with Licea, the other factors likely will not consistently favor one 
law over the other, but given the relevant connections to Israel, a “better law” 
jurisdiction would likely apply Israeli law. 
Finally, with Jama the central legal question would be whether the 
government contractors deserve sovereign immunity in the context where the 
defendants acted outside the scope of their authority in abusing the plaintiffs. A 
court applying the better law would likely apply forum law in the absence of 
any substantive conflict with New Jersey law. But in any case, domestic tort 
law would prevail. 
 
 248 Compare CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode. 
do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721&dateTexte=20060406 (“Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause 
à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer,” which when translated 
provides, “Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it 
occurred, to compensate it.” (Georges Rouhette & Anne Rouhette-Berton trans., 2006), http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/Code_22.pdf), with CODE CIVIL art. 1382 (Côte d’Ivoire), 
available at http://www.loidici.com/Codecivilcentral/codecivilcontratquasidelits.php (providing the same); see 
also Geneviève Viney, Tort Liability, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 237 (George A. Bermann & Etienne 
Picard eds., 2008) (providing an overview of French tort law). The confluence of these two systems is unclear 
but presumably would permit the application of international law for torts that violated human rights treaties 
and the application of traditional tort claims for lesser malfeasances. 
 249 Israeli tort law, like its counterpart in the United States, is well developed and sophisticated. For 
commentary on Israeli tort law, see, for example, Israel Gilead, Israel, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAWS: TORT LAW (Sophie Stijns ed., 2003); Israel Gilead & Tamar Gidron, Tort Law in Israel: An Overview, 
in XVIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW § II.A.5 (2006). 
 250 As noted above, the federal court in Corrie avoided the question of choosing an applicable tort law by 
concluding that plaintiff’s claim would fail under any applicable law. See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. 
Supp. 2d 1019, 1030–31 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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The “better law” approach likely would result in the application of foreign 
law in Kiobel, Licea, and Corrie, and the application of domestic law in 
Unocal, Abagninin, and Jama. 
F. Applying the Eclectic Approach 
An eclectic choice-of-law approach would combine various elements of the 
previous approaches with unpredictable results for our factual scenarios.251 
With all six of the factual scenarios, the parties have split domiciles, 
leading to a presumption favoring lex loci delicti with respect to loss-allocating 
rules.252 Thus, in Kiobel the presumption favors the application of Nigerian 
law, while in Licea, Unocal, Abagninin, Corrie, and Jama, the presumption 
favors the application of the laws of Curaçao, Burma, Ivory Coast, Israel, and 
New Jersey, respectively. In none of these factual scenarios was the place of 
the tortious behavior fortuitous, which might obviate the territorial 
presumption.253 
Under the Neumeier rules, the territorial presumption applicable in split 
domiciles may be overcome to “advance the relevant substantive law 
purposes.”254 This eclectic approach incorporates governmental interests into 
the analysis, interests such as protecting New York residents injured in foreign 
states or shielding New York defendants.255 But with no New York plaintiffs 
or defendants, there are no obvious New York interests justifying a departure 
from the territorial presumption. In addition, “the number and intensity of 
contacts is relevant when considering whether to deviate” from the territorial 
presumption,256 and in all six scenarios those contacts favor the maintenance of 
the lex loci delicti presumption. 
Abagninin raises the difficult question of the appropriate loss-allocating 
rule when the parties have split domiciles and the wrongful conduct occurred 
in the defendants’ home jurisdiction while the injury occurred in the plaintiffs’ 
home jurisdiction. Assuming the place of wrongful conduct and defendants’ 
 
 251 As the most important of the eclectic jurisdictions, this analysis will focus on New York’s eclectic 
approach as discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 102–06. 
 252 See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972). 
 253 See Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 13 (2d Cir. 1996); supra text accompanying 
notes 145–52. 
 254 Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458. 
 255 See id. at 456–58. 
 256 Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Co., 952 N.E.2d 1033, 1044 (N.Y. 2011). 
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domicile (California) has a pro-defendant law, and the place of injury and 
plaintiffs’ domicile (in this case, Ivory Coast) has a pro-plaintiff law, a court 
would be faced with a factual scenario outside the traditional Neumeier 
paradigm.257 In such a scenario, the application of Ivory Coast law would be 
appropriate if the defendants foresaw the resulting injury in Ivory Coast.258 If, 
on the other hand, California law seeks to regulate its corporations’ wrongful 
conduct259 and Ivory Coast law seeks to protect its citizens from wrongful 
conduct,260 the interests of both jurisdictions would align and California law 
would apply. 
To the extent the choice-of-law question concerns conduct-regulating rules, 
New York courts are to give “controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction 
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, 
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.”261 In 
the conduct-regulating context, the governmental interest will focus on the 
locus of the defendant’s wrongful conduct, not the locus of the plaintiff’s 
injuries.262 In Licci and Wultz, this led to the application of New York and 
Chinese law, respectively, to resolve claims arising from terrorist attacks in 
Israel.263 Assuming a court would apply conduct-regulating rules in a similar 
fashion, the focus should be on the locus of the defendants’ wrongful conduct. 
In most of the six factual scenarios, this would not alter the result because the 
place of the tort and injury coincide. But in Abagninin, California law would 
apply to the design and manufacture of the toxic chemicals. 
Finally, any analysis of New York’s eclectic approach is not complete 
without a public policy analysis, precluding the application of foreign law that 
is contrary to New York public policy.264 Provided there are sufficient contacts 
with New York,265 such a public policy exception would likely apply in factual 
 
 257 See HAY ET AL., supra note 48, § 17.44.  
 258 See id. 
 259 See Bowoto v. Chevron, Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 
2006). 
 260 See CODE CIVIL art. 1382 (Côte d’Ivoire) (“Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un 
dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer.”). 
 261 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 672 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fin. 
One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 337 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 262 See id.; Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 865 F. Supp. 2d 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 263 See supra text accompanying notes 153–58. 
 264 See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 687–89 (N.Y. 1985). 
 265 See Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of China, 923 F.2d 957, 964 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that 
“a party seeking to invoke a public policy exception to the application of foreign law must establish that there 
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scenarios such as Doe v. Unocal, leading to the application of New York law 
where Burmese law is unknowable or violates fundamental principles of 
justice.266 
The result under New York’s eclectic approach is the application of foreign 
law in most of the factual scenarios except in Unocal, where New York public 
policy would favor New York over Burmese law, and in Abagninin, where 
conduct-regulating rules would favor the application of California law as the 
place of wrongful conduct. 
G. Summary of the Competing Approaches 
The application of these choice-of-law approaches to the six factual 
scenarios underscores the critical distinction that key facts play in the decision 
as to the appropriate choice of law. This analysis is preliminary and subject to 
correction based on more detailed analysis of the particular law and facts. But 
this exercise illuminates the general contours of how choice of law would be 




are enough important contacts between the parties, the occurrence and the New York forum to implicate [New 
York’s] public policy and thus preclude enforcement of the foreign law.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the absence of sufficient contacts, New 
York law would not apply. 
 266 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918). For a California court’s 
application of public policy in this Unocal context, see Ruling on Defendants’ Choice of Law Motions, Nos. 
BC 237980, BC 237679, slip op. at 10 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 30, 2003); and supra note 221 and accompanying 
text. 
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As Table 2 indicates, where there is no nexus to the United States, as in the 
case of Kiobel, all six approaches are likely to apply foreign law. Where there 
is only a plaintiff-based connection to the United States based on after-
acquired domicile, as in the case of Licea, all six approaches are likely to apply 
foreign law. Where there is a plaintiff-based and defendant-based connection 
to the United States but the parties have split domiciles, as in the case of 
Corrie, all six approaches are likely to apply foreign law. Where there is a 
defendant-based and conduct-based connection to the United States, as in 
Abagninin, five of the six approaches are likely to apply domestic law, and one 
approach (lex loci delicti) is likely to apply foreign law. Where there is a 
defendant-based connection to the United States and the alternative foreign law 
is seriously deficient, as in the case of Unocal, all six approaches are likely to 
apply domestic law. Finally, where there is a defendant-based, conduct-based, 
and injury-based connection to the United States, as in the case of Jama, all six 
approaches are likely to apply domestic law. 
Our prediction of how the different choice-of-law approaches might resolve 
human rights cases comports with empirical studies showing that courts do not 
favor domestic law when confronted with international choice-of-law 
scenarios. The results of one well-known study articulated the following 
predictive rule: 
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[A] judge is most likely to apply domestic law when the locus of the 
underlying activity is mostly or all inside U.S. territory and the 
parties are mostly or all domestic, and she is least likely to do so 
when the locus of activity is mostly or all outside U.S. territory and 
the parties are mostly or all foreign. This . . . prediction decreases . . . 
as territoriality and personality become more balanced.267 
This prediction mirrors the results of our own analysis, with territoriality and 
personality strongly affecting the outcome under all of the choice-of-law 
approaches. The one significant caveat is that our analysis predicts that public 
policy considerations in Unocal would lead to the application of domestic law 
when other considerations would predict the choice of foreign law. 
Diagnosing how choice-of-law principles might apply to human rights 
claims does not answer the question of whether this approach is attractive. The 
next Part outlines the virtues of transnational tort litigation as compared to 
litigation under the ATS. From the perspective of human rights victims, 
transnational tort litigation has numerous virtues over international human 
rights litigation. 
V. THE VIRTUES OF TRANSNATIONAL TORT LITIGATION 
Transnational tort litigation has numerous distinctions from international 
human rights litigation under the ATS. First, such litigation permits the 
extraterritorial application of common law tort claims in appropriate 
circumstances. Second, reliance on foreign laws typically will be available 
given the universality of a cause of action for intentional torts. Third, tort 
litigation provides lower thresholds for liability based on a wide range of 
behavior, including intentional and negligent conduct. Fourth, tort laws hold 
both individual and corporate actors liable for tortious conduct. Fifth, choice-
of-law rules are sufficiently nuanced to apply one law to determine liability 
and another law to determine damages. Sixth, transnational tort litigation 
permits actions in state court, thereby avoiding the heightened pleading 
standards applicable in federal courts. Seventh, for suits filed in state court 
under state law, forum non conveniens dismissals do not have the same force 
or favor as in federal courts. Finally, preemption will rarely be an issue where 
a court applies state or foreign tort laws to resolve the dispute. 
 
 267 Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
719, 777 (2009). 
ALFORD GALLEYSPROOFS2 6/9/2014 9:06 AM 
2014] HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER KIOBEL 1147 
This is not to suggest that transnational tort litigation does not face 
obstacles similar to human rights litigation under the ATS. For example, limits 
on personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, head of state immunity, the act 
of state doctrine, and the political question doctrine should apply with equal 
force to tort and human rights claims.268 These limits ensure that state and 
federal courts do not violate defendants’ minimum due process rights, do not 
sit in judgment on the sovereign acts of other nations, and do not encroach on 
matters reserved for the political branches. 
A. Extraterritorial Application 
State tort laws routinely are applied extraterritorially. There are 
constitutional limits, but those limits are rarely meaningful.269 Under the Due 
Process Clause, a state may apply its own laws if it has any “significant contact 
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,” with the parties 
and the occurrence or transaction.270 State choice-of-law principles incorporate 
these constitutional limitations and refrain from applying state tort laws in the 
absence of sufficient contacts or interests.271 
Beyond these constitutional limits, there is no presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of state tort laws. “[I]n contrast to federal courts 
considering the reach of U.S. law abroad, courts generally do not regard the 
decision to apply state law to events abroad in terms of the extraterritorial 
 
 268 See Whytock, Childress & Ramsey, supra note 39, at 6–7. 
 269 See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality 
Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1075–82 (2009); Douglas 
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257 (1992). 
 270 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 735 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). A different, more stringent standard under the dormant Commerce Clause applies to the 
extraterritorial application of state legislation. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989); CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
476 U.S. 573, 582–84 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982). See generally Florey, 
supra note 269, at 1084–94 (“In a series of cases in the 1980s, the Supreme Court articulated a strong . . . 
prohibition on extraterritoriality under the rubric of the dormant Commerce Clause.”). 
 271 The Court has declared that another constitutional limitation, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, must be 
“interpreted against the background of principles developed in international conflicts law,” Wortman, 486 U.S. 
at 723, perhaps suggesting that the state laws that are consistent with international principles would satisfy 
constitutional limitations. See C. Steven Bradford, What Happens If Roe Is Overruled? Extraterritorial 
Regulation of Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 87, 120–21 (1993). While both the Due Process Clause 
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause limit the application of state law, only the Due Process Clause limits a 
state’s application abroad. See Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1531, 1552 n.161 (2011). 
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reach of the state’s power to assert legislative jurisdiction.”272 Instead, 
questions as to the appropriateness of applying state tort law to foreign conduct 
are embedded in the choice-of-law analysis, resulting in the balancing of 
interests, accommodations to the international system, and presumptions that 
lex loci delicti will apply.273 In other words, the extraterritorial application of 
state tort law is “independently regulated by each state’s choice-of-law 
rules.”274 In this sense, choice of law adopts a reasonableness test for 
prescriptive jurisdiction akin to the multifactor balancing approach 
recommended by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.275 
Importantly, to the extent constitutional or other limits circumscribe the 
extraterritorial application of state tort laws, these limitations will not divest a 
state court of general jurisdiction (or a federal court sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction) from adjudicating the claim; they will simply require the parties to 
plead, and the court to apply, foreign tort law. Under the transitory tort 
doctrine, courts of general jurisdiction are empowered to enforce tort 
obligations arising under foreign law, and those obligations follow the person 
and may be enforced wherever the person is found.276 “[S]ince a personal tort 
claim is transitory in nature, it is . . . the general rule that . . . it may be sued 
upon wherever the defendant is subject to suit . . . .”277 Thus, once personal 
jurisdiction is established, the transitory tort doctrine presumes a court of 
general jurisdiction is authorized to resolve claims based on causes of action 
that arise in other jurisdictions.278 Even if state tort laws may not regulate the 
foreign conduct of foreign defendants, state courts may adjudicate claims 
alleging violations of foreign law. 
 
 272 Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the Extraterritorial Effects 
of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 552 (2012). 
 273 See supra text accompanying notes 57–68. 
 274 Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law Apply Abroad, 102 GEO. L.J. 
301, 306 (2014). 
 275 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402–03 (1987). This also approximates 
the approach of Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Kiobel. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 
S. Ct. 1659, 1673–77 (2013) (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 276 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (quoting Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912)); Slater v. 
Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).  
 277 Richardson v. Pac. Power & Light Co., 118 P.2d 985, 991 (Wash. 1941); accord Mendoza v. 
Neudorfer Eng’rs, Inc., 185 P.3d 1204, 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). 
 278 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665–66.  
ALFORD GALLEYSPROOFS2 6/9/2014 9:06 AM 
2014] HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER KIOBEL 1149 
B. Universal Norms 
Transnational tort claims are universal. One need not invoke international 
law or domestic tort laws to find a violation of human rights. Almost all the 
international norms that are the subject of human rights litigation find their 
corollary in municipal law. A retreat from international law litigation is not an 
invitation to impunity. 
In public law, constitutions increasingly are generic in their guarantees. The 
prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention is reflected in 94% of all 
constitutions, the prohibition on torture in 84% of all constitutions, and the 
right to life in 78% of all constitutions.279 Over twenty-five rights are common 
to over 70% of all constitutions, and they may therefore be described as a 
collection of generic bills of rights.280 Guarantees of life and liberty are a 
common norm in global constitutionalism. 
As far as private law, a comparative analysis of tort laws likewise finds a 
move toward harmonization, particularly with respect to intentional torts. 
Liability for intentional torts is common in virtually every tort system in the 
world.281 According to the International Commission of Jurists, “[i]n every 
jurisdiction, despite differences in terminology and approach, an actor may be 
held liable under the law of civil remedies if through negligent or intentional 
conduct it causes harm to someone else.”282 Regardless of the distinctions 
between civil and common law, “in all jurisdictions the law of civil remedies 
can be invoked to remedy harm to life, liberty, dignity, physical and mental 
integrity and property.”283 Moreover, a comparison of choice-of-law rules 
suggests that lex loci delicti is the approach applied in most countries.284 
The harmonization of norms across legal systems has important 
ramifications for transnational tort litigation. If one assumes a fair and 
impartial adjudicator, remedies for harm to life and liberty are the law 
 
 279 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 762, 773–74 (2012). 
 280 Id. at 776–79. 
 281 See J. Limpens, R.M. Kruithof & A. Meinertzhagen-Limpens, Liability for One’s Own Act, in 11 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: TORTS ch. 2, at 3–12 (André Tunc ed., 1983). 
 282 3 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2008), 
available at http://www.icjcanada.org/fr/document/doc_2008-10_vol3.pdf.  
 283 Id. at 11. 
 284 See id. at 52. 
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throughout the civilized world.285 Therefore, a decision to apply foreign law to 
remedy wrongful conduct should provide, under most legal systems, a legal 
basis for liability. There will be exceptions and important distinctions, but the 
starting point of liability for intentional harm is common across almost all legal 
systems. 
The similarity among the tort laws of different countries increases the 
likelihood that domestic tort law will be applied under the doctrine of false 
conflicts. In essence, this doctrine holds that if the competing laws are the 
same, there is no need to choose among them.286 For example, under the New 
York choice-of-law principles that would have applied in Kiobel, “[t]he first 
step in any case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine 
whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions 
involved.”287 Laws are in conflict where “the applicable law from each 
jurisdiction provides different substantive rules.”288 Where the laws of 
competing jurisdictions are not in conflict and “New York law is among the 
relevant choices, New York courts are free to apply it.”289 
C. Lower Liability Thresholds 
The threshold for establishing an actionable international law violation 
under the ATS is incredibly high. According to the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Sosa, for a claim to be actionable under the ATS, “courts should require any 
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” that Blackstone 
defined, viz., “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
 
 285 Indeed, when the problem is the quality of the adjudicator, not the foreign law, a state court may refuse 
to transfer the case to a foreign jurisdiction under forum non conveniens and resolve the dispute by applying 
foreign law. See infra text accompanying notes 322–38. 
 286 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 838 n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 
(D.D.C. 2008); Gulf Grp. Holdings, Inc. v. Coast Asset Mgmt. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 
2007). A variation of this false-conflict analysis that is applied in the governmental interest approach to 
conflict of laws looks to whether all competing states have an interest in applying their own laws. If only one 
involved state has an interest in applying its law, there is a false conflict. See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution 
and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 10 (1958). 
For an analysis of the false-conflict doctrine, see supra note 91. 
 287 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 937 (N.Y. 1993). 
 288 Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 331 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Elson v. 
Defren, 726 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (App. Div. 2001). 
 289 Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 363 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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ambassadors, and piracy.”290 In Sosa, the act of kidnapping and false 
imprisonment did not give rise to an actionable claim under international 
law.291 As the Court put it, “a single illegal detention of less than a day, 
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt 
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law.”292 
This high threshold has led lower courts to routinely dismiss ATS claims 
for torts relating to the environment, sexual misconduct, child labor, business 
fraud, defamation, and the like.293 Instead, the ATS standard typically requires 
conduct such as extrajudicial killings, torture, genocide, prolonged arbitrary 
detention, nonconsensual human experimentation, crimes against humanity, or 
systematic racial discrimination.294 “The common theme among these offenses 
is that they contravened the law of nations, admitted of a judicial remedy, and 
simultaneously threatened serious consequences in international affairs.”295 
Transnational torts have much lower thresholds than the standards applied 
under international law, allowing claims to be brought for intentional torts, 
simple negligence, strict products liability, or any other harmful or offensive 
conduct that constitutes a legal wrong. Human rights litigation is about grave 
public wrongs; transnational tort litigation is about redressing simple, private 
wrongs. “Tort law provides victims with an avenue of civil recourse against 
those who have committed relational and injurious wrongs against them. Tort 
law is thus plainly private law in the sense that it is about empowering private 
parties to initiate proceedings designed to hold tortfeasors accountable.”296 As 
 
 290 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004). 
 291 See id. at 698. 
 292 Id. at 738. 
 293 See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021–24 (7th Cir. 2011); Mora v. New 
York, 524 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2008); Cisneros v. Aragon, 485 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2007); Flores v. 
S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 236–37, 254 (2d Cir. 2003); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 
161, 168 (5th Cir. 1999); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995); Maugein v. 
Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One 
Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation 
in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2264–65 (2004). 
 294 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2009); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 
1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); Garcia v. Chapman, 911 F. 
Supp. 2d 1222, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074–79 (C.D. Cal. 2010), 
vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (2013); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 
1080, 1093–94, (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010); Roe I v. Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d 
988, 1014 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Steinhardt, supra note 293, at 2264–65. 
 295 Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 173. 
 296 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 946–47 (2010). 
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such, transnational tort litigation encompasses a wide range of legally wrongful 
conduct, including conduct that is not morally blameworthy. By lowering the 
threshold for actionable claims, a transnational tort system provides an 
effective mechanism for private citizens to regulate dangerous and harmful 
activities that fall below the human rights threshold. 
Convincing a jury that a multinational corporation was negligent in its 
overseas activities is far easier than convincing a jury that a corporation 
intentionally aided and abetted torture or extrajudicial killings.297 If plaintiffs 
embrace this lower threshold and pursue transnational torts, they increase the 
chances that tortfeasors will become accident avoiders. 
This is true regardless of whether domestic or foreign tort law is applied. In 
tort systems around the world the standard of care owed to the public under 
traditional tort law encompasses a broader range of conduct than the standard 
owed under international human rights law.298 In some cases foreign tort laws 
are broader than domestic tort laws, providing remedies for affronts to 
dignity.299 Therefore, by reframing human rights violations as traditional torts, 
the universe of protected interests expands significantly. 
D. Corporate Liability 
One of the most difficult aspects of international human rights litigation has 
been the obligation to establish that corporate defendants aided and abetted 
government abuse. There is an extensive debate regarding the standard for 
accessorial liability under international law, with some circuit courts arguing 
the standard should be purposeful intent, and others arguing that the standard 
should be mere knowledge that an international-law violation would occur.300 
 
 297 Compare Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1122–26 (discussing a jury trial in favor of the corporation on all claims 
of aiding and abetting torture and extrajudicial killings), with Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 30 januari 2013, NJF 2013, 
99 (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.) (finding the corporation guilty of negligence in failing to maintain 
pipelines that third parties sabotaged), and Roger Alford, Dutch Court Issues Mixed Ruling on Shell’s Liability 
for Nigerian Environmental Claim, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 5, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/ 
2013/02/05/dutch-court-issues-mixed-ruling-on-shells-liability-for-nigerian-environmental-claim/.  
 298 See generally INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR TORT LAW (Ingrid Boone ed., 2001).  
 299 Borchers, supra note 229, at 51; Julie A. Davies & Dominic N. Dagbanja, The Role and Future of 
Customary Tort Law in Ghana: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, 26 ARIZ J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 310–11 
(2009). 
 300 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 765–66 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(2013) (noting that at least purposeful aiding and abetting is sufficient); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 
F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (discussing the knowledge test); 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) (requiring a 
purposeful aiding and abetting test); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 272–77 (2d Cir. 
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Transnational litigation applying domestic or foreign tort laws avoids this 
problem. With civil liability applying foreign or domestic tort laws, evidence 
that the corporate actor intended to commit an international-law violation is 
simply irrelevant. Establishing that a corporate defendant aided and abetted 
government abuse with the requisite intent is likewise irrelevant. What matters 
is whether the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct would 
cause harm.301 
Corporate liability is an accepted principle of tort law throughout the 
world.302 “Corporations have been subject to suit for centuries, and the concept 
of corporate liability is a well-settled part of our ‘legal culture.’”303 The 
question is not whether juridical entities may be liable for wrongful conduct 
under domestic or foreign tort laws, but under what circumstances.304 
E. Damages 
As discussed above,305 an analysis of choice of law in the typical human 
rights scenario will result in the application of foreign tort law. One of the 
consequences of applying foreign law to resolve transnational torts is that the 
available remedies often will be lower than those available under domestic 
law. One prominent choice-of-law scholar has argued that the great risk of 
human rights litigation in state courts is that those courts would feel “bound to 
apply the damage law of the foreign country” and “[i]n practical terms, this 
risks making actions unsustainable.”306 
It is not apparent that this will be the result for transnational torts. Courts 
routinely separate the choice-of-law analysis for liability and damages, 
 
2007), aff’d sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (requiring a purposeful aiding 
and abetting test); Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and 
Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 52 (2003). See 
generally Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2008) 
(discussing the two standards). 
 301 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 282, at 12–13. 
 302 See Exxon, 654 F.3d at 48 (“[F]rom the earliest times to the present day, corporations have been liable 
for torts.” (quoting JOSEPH K. ANGEL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
AGGREGATE 222–23 & n.1 (1832)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, 
supra note 282, at 10.  
 303 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/10-1491_petitioner_amcu_unitedstates.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 304 See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 282, at 28–41, 45–49. 
 305 See supra text accompanying notes 176–267. 
 306 Borchers, supra note 229, at 52. 
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resulting in the application of one law to determine liability and another law to 
determine damages.307 Quantification of damages typically is considered a 
procedural question, resulting in the application of forum law.308 Moreover, 
numerous cases have found that limitations on liability are false conflicts when 
the defendant is a nonresident corporation. For jurisdictions that apply a 
governmental interest analysis, for example, defendants invoking damage 
limitations pursuant to foreign law must show that doing so will further the 
interests of the foreign state.309 But “foreign states are generally presumed to 
have absolutely no interest in reducing recovery by their residents against non-
resident tortfeasors.”310 Accordingly, where a foreign jurisdiction has no 
interest in protecting the financial exposure of the defendant, damage 
limitations under foreign law will be ignored in favor of more liberal damage 
standards applied under domestic law. 
To the extent courts would apply the lower damage amounts applicable in 
foreign countries, this is not necessarily a problem. In many respects this 
limitation actually is a virtue of the transnational torts regime. Choice-of-law 
analysis safeguards the uniform application of law by minimizing the impact 
that forum shopping will have on the outcome of a case. If differential 
damages applied depending upon the forum, then corporations subject to suit 
in the United States would face discriminatory liability standards that other 
competitors not amenable to suit would avoid.311 The result would be a 
potential “tort tax” for doing business in the United States. 
By this reasoning, pursuing transnational torts in the United States pursuant 
to foreign liability standards strikes an appropriate balance. It provides an 
effective forum for relief, but places defendants amenable to suit in the United 
States on a comparatively equal footing with defendants amenable to suit in 
 
 307 See Eric Lasker & Rebecca Womeldorf, Prescription Drug Products Liability Litigation and Punitive 
Damages Preemption, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 123, 126–27 (2013); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the 
American Courts in 2004: Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 959 (2004); Christopher G. 
Stevenson, Note, Depecage: Embracing Complexity to Solve Choice-of-Law Issues, 37 IND. L. REV. 303, 311–
12 (2003). 
 308 See Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the United States 
Forum, 52 ARK. L. REV. 157, 168–75 (1999). 
 309 See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indon. on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing 
Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 670 (Cal. 1974)). 
 310 Marsh v. Burrell, 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1992); accord Downing v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 311 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 68, at 1146–47; Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for 
Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 
2194 (2012). 
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other jurisdictions. Corporate defendants amenable to suit in the United States 
should face liability risks for transnational torts similar to the risks faced by 
corporations sued in other jurisdictions.312 The objective of a transnational torts 
regime should encourage tortfeasors to avoid committing foreign torts, without 
subjecting particular tortfeasors to discriminatory liability standards. 
F. Notice Pleading 
Filing state or foreign law claims in state court has distinct procedural 
advantages. With Ashcroft v. Iqbal313 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,314 
the Supreme Court has announced that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”315 This new pleading 
standard “demands that the nonconclusory factual allegations reach a level of 
plausibility that justifies the likely discovery expense.”316 Yet plaintiffs face 
significant hurdles in pleading plausible human rights claims precisely because 
they do not have access to discovery to determine questions such as whether a 
corporate officer had the requisite purposeful intent to aid and abet human 
rights abuses.317 Not surprisingly, this heightened pleading standard has 
 
 312 Corporate defendants have lost significant human rights cases applying foreign tort laws in 
jurisdictions such as Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Dagi v Broken Hill 
Proprietary Ltd. (No.2.) (1997) 1 VR 428 (Austl.); Hof ’s-Gravenhage 5 juli 2011, 200.020.174/01 (Mothers 
of Srebrenica/ Netherlands) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 30 januari 2013, NJF 2013, 99 (Akpan/Royal Dutch 
Shell PLC) (Neth.); Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 21 maart 2012, 400882/HA ZA 11-2252 (El-Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.); 
Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 14 september 2011, NJF 2011, 427 (Silan/Netherlands) (Neth.); Chandler v. Cape PLC, 
[2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [1], [82] (appeal taken from Q.B.); Motto v. Trafigura Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ) 
1150, [145] (appeal taken from Q.B.); Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals Plc, [2010] EWHC (QB) 3228, [57], 
[59] (U.K.); Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals Plc, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475, [31] (U.K.); Amicus Curiae, supra 
note 242, at 7–15; Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A 
Comparative Scorecard, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 127, 130 (2013); Michael D. Goldhaber, U.K. Shell Deal 
Spotlights Value of Common Law Model for Human Rights Litigation, CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202512820360. 
 313 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 314 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). 
 315 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). 
 316 Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 62 (2010). There is some 
empirical evidence suggesting that the heightened pleading standard in Iqbal and Twombly has not led to a 
greater incidence of dismissals of tort claims. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 14 tbl.4 (2011) (reflecting a dismissal rate of 30.0% before Iqbal and 28.2% after 
Iqbal), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf. 
 317 See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational 
Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 730, 738 (2012). For an example of insufficient pleading of corporate mens rea, 
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resulted in federal courts dismissing many international human rights 
claims.318 
Pleading a violation of transnational torts in most state courts faces no such 
hurdles. The notice pleading standard applied in the majority of state courts is 
“that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”319 Pursuing state law tort claims 
in state courts is more likely to overcome a motion to dismiss than if the same 
claim were filed in federal court. Thus, plaintiffs struggling with the 
heightened federal pleading standard may wish to pursue state tort law claims 
in state court, and file in the defendant’s home state to avoid removal to federal 
court on diversity grounds.320 This is particularly so given that filing in the 
defendant’s home state also minimizes the likelihood that the case will be 
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.321 
 
see Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1266–69 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). 
 318 See, e.g., Abelesz, v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2012); Bigio v. Coca-
Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 173–75 (2d Cir. 2012); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153–56 (11th Cir. 2011); Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1266–69; Doe I v. 
Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1098, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 
738 F.3d 1048 (2013).  
 319 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 
(1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (identifying twenty-six states and the District of Columbia that 
follow the Conley standard repudiated in Twombly); see also Mark W. Payne, The Post-Iqbal State of 
Pleading: An Argument Opposing a Uniform National Pleading Regime, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 245, 259–
65 (2012) (summarizing pleading practices in state courts following Iqbal and Twombly); Z.W. Julius Chen, 
Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1431, 1432 (2008) (summarizing history of pleading standards in state courts); Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Note, 
Challenging the Plausibility Standard Under the Rules Enabling Act, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2379, 2385–86 (2013) 
(“[A] majority of state appellate courts have either rejected the plausibility standard or declined to apply it.” 
(footnote omitted)); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State Courts After Twombly and Iqbal 14–18 (2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038349 (summarizing 
pleading practices in state courts following Iqbal and Twombly). 
 320 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012) (“A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the 
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly 
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”); Childress, supra 
note 317, at 741. 
 321 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“With respect to a corporation, the place of 
incorporation and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] bases for general jurisdiction.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 735 
(1988))); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (noting that general 
jurisdiction requires affiliations “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the foreign corporation] 
essentially at home in the forum State”); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786–90 (2011) 
(discussing constitutional limits on specific jurisdiction). 
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G. Forum Non Conveniens 
Transnational litigation claims are often dismissed in federal court on the 
basis of the federal common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.322 Claims 
brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for conduct on foreign 
soil are ripe for dismissal because the forum is inconvenient.323 For suits filed 
in state court under state law, however, dismissal on the basis of forum non 
conveniens does not have the same force or favor as in federal court.324 
Almost every state has established state standards for forum non 
conveniens.325 The majority of states follow the federal standard set forth in 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert326 and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,327 but others 
freely define their own standard.328 States that choose to depart from the 
federal standard often make forum non conveniens dismissals impossible or 
substantially more difficult. For example, Colorado, Louisiana, and Virginia 
prohibit dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds if the plaintiff is a state 
resident.329 Montana prohibits a forum non conveniens transfer outside the 
state.330 Delaware requires a defendant to show overwhelming hardship in 
order to succeed on a motion.331 Connecticut courts strongly disfavor such 
dismissals, finding that the plaintiffs’ choice of forum “should rarely be 
 
 322 See Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient Forum in 
Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 169–70 (2012); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational 
Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1095–97 (2010). 
 323 See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 517–
28 (2011). 
 324 See Childress, supra note 322, at 171–72. 
 325 See Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1180 n.9 (R.I. 2008) (citing source of forum non 
conveniens standard in forty-six states).  
 326 See 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947). 
 327 See 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). 
 328 See Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 
309, 315 & n.17 (2002) (identifying states that follow the federal standard); Linda J. Silberman, Developments 
in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal 
for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 501, 518–25 (1993) (discussing state forum non conveniens 
standards); David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury 
Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 950 & n.74 (1990) (identifying 
the states that follow the federal standard); Sidney K. Smith, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign 
Policy: Time for Congressional Intervention?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 743, 748–58 (2012) (discussing the divergent 
approaches of states). 
 329 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-1004 (West 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 123 (2012); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.01-265 (West Supp. 2013). 
 330 Cook v. Soo Line R.R., 2008 MT 421, ¶ 16, 347 Mont. 372, 198 P.3d 310. 
 331 Ison v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 729 A.2d 832, 837–38 (Del. 1999); Chrysler First Bus. Credit 
Corp. v. 1500 Locust Ltd. P’ship, 669 A.2d 104, 105 (Del. 1995); Gen. Foods Corp. v. Cryo-Maid, Inc., 198 
A.2d 681, 684 (Del. 1964); see also Smith, supra note 328, at 756–57. 
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disturbed” and that dismissal on forum non conveniens is a “drastic remedy 
which the trial court must approach with caution and restraint.”332 
As for states that follow the federal standard, they are not uniform in the 
manner in which they apply it, providing plaintiffs with opportunities to use 
those subtle differences to their advantage.333 For example, the Washington 
Supreme Court has adopted the federal standard, but rejected Piper’s “lesser 
deference” rule with respect to foreign plaintiffs.334 The Georgia Supreme 
Court has adopted the federal standard for nonresident aliens, but not for 
foreigners who reside within the United States.335 The Alaska Supreme Court 
has held that where the “plaintiff is a bona fide resident of the forum state, the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens has only an extremely limited 
application.”336 New York forecloses forum non conveniens dismissals where 
the parties to a contract agreed to be bound by New York law.337 Thus, despite 
otherwise following Piper, many state standards are less solicitous to foreign 
plaintiffs than the federal standard. 
Given the frequency with which federal courts dismiss transnational tort 
claims, state courts may be a preferred option for transnational claims. One 
factor in the calculus of where to sue will be the state court vagaries in 
applying forum non conveniens. But one should not make too much of these 
differences. The balance of public and private interest factors common under 
both federal and state standards promotes the policy of dismissing claims that 
have an insufficient nexus to the forum. A court’s discretion in balancing the 
various factors often makes it almost impossible to predict the outcome of a 
forum non conveniens motion to dismiss.338 
H. Preemption 
Reliance on state tort laws such as wrongful death or assault and battery to 
resolve disputes arising from foreign conduct may implicate foreign-affairs 
concerns, particularly when the defendant acted in concert with foreign or U.S. 
 
 332 Picketts v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 576 A.2d 518, 524–25 (Conn. 1990) (italics removed) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 333 See Note, Cross-Jurisdictional Forum Non Conveniens Preclusion, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2178, 2194 
(2008). 
 334 See Myers v. Boeing Co., 794 P.2d 1272, 1281 (Wash. 1990). 
 335 See AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373, 377–78 (Ga. 2001). 
 336 Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905, 908 (Alaska 1985).  
 337 N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 327(b) (McKinney 2010). 
 338 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994). 
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government officials. But state tort laws represent a quintessential exercise of 
traditional state prerogatives, and courts will be reluctant to invoke preemption 
doctrines to dismiss traditional tort claims.339 
As transnational tort litigation begins to address international human rights 
abuses with greater frequency, there is a growing risk that state tort laws will 
be applied extraterritorially and will conflict with federal laws or foreign 
affairs concerns. In a few instances courts have held that state tort claims in the 
transnational tort context must be dismissed under federal preemption.340 
State laws designed to engage in foreign policy or interfere with foreign 
affairs are particularly vulnerable to foreign affairs preemption.341 Conversely, 
state laws of general applicability that are not designed to influence U.S. 
foreign relations are unlikely to be dismissed under foreign affairs 
preemption.342 Occasionally, as with allegations of tortious conduct by U.S. 
government contractors during wartime, traditional state tort claims may be 
dismissed under foreign affairs preemption.343 Preemption also is more likely 
with traditional tort claims where state interests in the dispute are weak and the 
claim implicates strong federal policies with respect to foreign affairs.344 Thus, 
state tort claims may in rare circumstances face preemption issues, but 
typically traditional tort laws of general applicability will avoid this fate. 
Choice of law adds an additional wrinkle to the preemption analysis. In 
many cases involving foreign conduct, the proper application of choice-of-law 
principles will obviate preemption concerns. For example, in Doe VIII v. 
 
 339 See Wos v. E.M.A. ex. rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1400 (2013) (“In our federal system, there is no 
question that States possess the ‘traditional authority to provide tort remedies to their citizens’ as they see fit.” 
(quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984))). For a discussion of preemption in the 
context of states’ traditional competencies, see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003); 
and Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000). 
 340 See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. 
Supp. 2d 1164, 1171, 1183–88 (C.D. Cal. 2005). State laws may be preempted under dormant preemption 
doctrines, such as foreign affairs preemption or statutory preemption doctrines. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory 
Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 203–08; Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of 
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2097–12 (2000). 
 341 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012); Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2010); Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 
324 F.3d 692, 708–11 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 342 See Movsesian, 670 F.3d at 1075; Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 964–65. 
 343 Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 (“During wartime, where a private service contractor is integrated into combatant 
activities over which the military retains command authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor’s 
engagement in such activities shall be preempted.”); cf. Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 
F.3d 1, 11–14 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 344 Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1187–88. 
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Exxon Mobil Corp., the D.C. Circuit held that “[b]ecause Indonesian law 
applies under District of Columbia choice of law rules, the court need not 
address Exxon’s federal preemption argument regarding District of Columbia 
and Delaware law.”345 When foreign law is applied, there is no application of 
state law to be preempted. Foreign affairs preemption does not preempt a state 
court’s exercise of its choice-of-law rules to apply foreign tort laws.346 
CONCLUSION 
The demise of the ATS following Kiobel will signal the rise of 
transnational tort litigation. The presumption against extraterritoriality severely 
limits the territorial reach of the ATS, requiring plaintiffs to establish that 
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force 
to displace the presumption.347 
No such presumption applies to state tort claims. Instead, courts examine 
the appropriateness of applying state tort laws through choice-of-law analysis. 
The likelihood that state tort laws will be applied to regulate foreign torts 
depends on the choice-of-law approach employed and the manner in which 
courts employ it. Some approaches will rarely result in the application of state 
tort laws to regulate foreign torts. For example, jurisdictions that maintain the 
traditional lex loci delicti approach will rarely apply state tort laws to regulate 
foreign torts. Other approaches that focus on factors and interests afford courts 
significant discretion to apply state tort laws extraterritorially. For example, 
given the governmental interests at stake, courts in the District of Columbia 
routinely have applied domestic state tort laws to regulate overseas terrorism. 
Human rights litigation in state courts under state law requires careful 
choice-of-law analysis. To test how leading ATS cases might fare in state court 
under state law, this Article examines a number of human rights test cases 
from a choice-of-law perspective. The results are not surprising: territoriality 
and personality strongly affect the outcome under all the choice-of-law 
approaches. The stronger the forum’s nexus to the conduct, injury, or parties, 
the more likely it will apply forum law. Conversely, a weak nexus to the 
 
 345 654 F.3d 11, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 346 For a discussion of federal statutory tort laws preempting state laws but not foreign laws in the context 
of death on the high seas, see Jackson v. N. Bank Towing Corp., 201 F.3d 415, 416–18 (5th Cir. 2000); Oyuela 
v. Seacor Marine (Nigeria), Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d. 713, 724 (E.D. La. 2003); Heath v. Am. Sail Training Ass’n, 
644 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (D.R.I. 1986); and Stier v. Reading & Bates Corp., 992 S.W.2d 423, 434–35 (Tex. 
1999). 
 347 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
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territory or the parties will almost invariably result in the application of foreign 
law. 
This Article concludes with a brief analysis of the virtues of transnational 
litigation in state court compared with federal court litigation of international 
law claims under the ATS. First, unlike the ATS, state tort laws apply 
extraterritorially. Subject to constitutional limits, there are no presumptions 
that limit the extraterritorial application of state tort laws. Second, civil liability 
for wrongful conduct is universal. In almost every jurisdiction, a tortfeasor will 
be held civilly liable for tortious conduct that causes harm to others. Third, tort 
claims have much lower liability thresholds than the standards applied under 
international law. By lowering the threshold, transnational tort claims regulate 
harmful activities that fall below the human rights threshold of grave public 
wrongs. Fourth, the uncertainties relating to corporate liability under 
international law are nonexistent with transnational torts. Corporate liability is 
an accepted principle of tort law throughout the world. Fifth, applying choice-
of-law principles minimizes the risk of discriminatory liability for corporations 
amenable to suit in the United States. Sixth, pursuing human rights claims in 
state court allows plaintiffs to avoid the heightened pleading standards of 
federal courts. Seventh, suits filed in state court are less likely to be dismissed 
on the basis of forum non conveniens because state court standards are often 
less stringent. Eighth, reframing a human rights claim as a traditional state law 
tort decreases the likelihood that the claim will be dismissed on preemption 
grounds. Pleading the claim under foreign law dramatically decreases this 
likelihood. 
Transnational tort litigation cannot replace the old version of ATS 
litigation. Pursuing human rights violations in state court under state law has 
merits and demerits. But after Kiobel, human rights lawyers have precious few 
alternatives. If human rights lawyers are looking for a silver lining to Kiobel, 
they will find it in the opportunities that transnational tort litigation offers. 
 
